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We analyze a large stratified random sample of firms that provide us with measures of 
performance and each firm’s top manager’s perception of the severity of business environment 
constraints  faced  by  his/her  firm.  Unlike  most  existing  studies  that  rely  on  external  and 
aggregated  proxy  measures  of  the  business  environment,  defined  to  include  legal  and 
institutional features,  we  have information from each  surveyed  firm. Specifically,  we  use  the 
2005 and 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) to assess 
the  effect  on  performance  of  ownership,  competition,  export  orientation  and  the  business 
environment of the firm. We employ a variety of approaches to deal with the problem of omitted 
variables,  errors in  variables  and  endogeneity  that  plague  studies in  this  area. We find that 
foreign ownership and competition have an impact on performance – measured as the level of 
sales  controlling    for  inputs.  Export  orientation  of  the  firm  does  not  have  an  effect  on 
performance once ownership is taken into account. When we analyze the impact of perceived 
constraints, we show that few retain explanatory power once they are introduced jointly rather 
than one at a time, or when country, industry and year fixed effects are introduced. Indeed, 
country fixed effects largely absorb the explanatory power of the constraints faced by individual 
firms.  Replicating  the  analysis  with  commonly  used  country-level  indicators  of  the  business 
environment, we do not find much of a relationship between constraints and performance. Our 
analysis  brings  into  question  an  important  part  of  the  conventional  wisdom  in  this  area.  It 
indicates  that  country  fixed  effects,  reflecting  time-invariant  differences  in  the  business 
environment  but  also  other  factors,  matter  for  firm  performance,  but  that  differences  in  the 
business environment observed across firms within countries do not. Moreover, the limited firm- 
and  country-level  variations  in  the  business  environment  over  time  do  not  appear  to  affect 
performance either. This suggests that the effect of business environment on performance and 
the analysts’ ability to identify this effect are more limited than has been assumed to date.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
 
The  efficiency  of  firms  in  developing  countries,  including  the  transition  economies,  is 
obviously  central  to  explaining  the  performance  of  these  economies  as  a  whole.  In  many 
developing countries, large firms were often historically state-owned and widely regarded as 
inefficient. Indeed, almost all firms in the transition economies started as being state owned with 
their objectives set consistent with the dictates of central planning. To escape these limitations, a 
combination of privatisation, entry of new private firms, and fundamental changes in the legal, 
institutional  and  regulatory  systems has  been at the  core  of the  development  and  transition 
process over the last two decades.  
The  above  policies  have  been  based  on  the  premise  that  a  key  determinant  of  firm 
performance  in  developing  as  well  as  developed  economies  is  the  state  of  the  business 
environment, defined broadly to include the key features of the legal, regulatory, financial, and 
institutional system.
1
 Indeed, it has been noted that the barriers to doing business vary widely 
across regions and countries,
2
 and it has been argued that the business environment will affect 
aggregate  performance,  as  well as  exert influence  on  the  operation  of  financial markets.
3
 A 
sizable empirical literature supporting various aspects of this view has appeared, using data at 
the country, industry and firm levels. However, the measurement of the business environment 
has encountered major methodological challenges that may have generated biased estimates 
on  account  of  issues  such  as  errors  in  variables,  omitted  variables  and  endogeneity  of 
regressors.  
First, much of the knowledge in this area derives from studies that rely on country-level 
proxy indicators of the business environment, such as governance (e.g., Kaufmann et al., 1999 
and  2002),  regulatory  constraints  (e.g.,  Djankov  et  al.,  2002,  and  Botero  et  al.  2004), 
competitiveness (e.g., World Economic Forum), transparency (e.g., Transparency International), 
bureaucratic quality, corruption and law and order (e.g., Political Risk Services), strength of the 
legal system (Durnev and Kim, 2005), and the level of economic freedom in an economy (e.g., 
Heritage Foundation). Many of these aggregate proxies of the actual phenomena contain little or 
no variation over time and thus are completely or almost indistinguishable from country-, sector- 
                                                 
1
 See for example, World Bank (2002) and EBRD (1999). 
2  World Bank (2005); World Economic Forum (2005). 
3
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or region-specific effects that may reflect other features than the business environment. Second, 
the  aggregate  studies  usually  estimate  the  association  between  features  of  business 
environment  and  macroeconomic  performance  rather  than  identify  the  causal  effects  of  the 
environment on performance (see, for example, discussion in Levine and Zervos, 1998, and 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
Industry-level studies, such as Rajan and Zingales (1998), Klapper et al. (2004), and 
Micco and Pages (2006), estimate the effects of a particular feature of the business environment 
on industry performance. They represent an advance over country-level studies in that they can 
control for country and industry effects and thus suffer less from an omitted variable bias. The 
trade-off is that in order to identify the performance effect, these studies need to assume that 
one  country,  the  United  States,  has  an  optimal  value  of  the  particular  feature  of  business 
environment and that there is some technological or other reason why in all countries some 
industries  depend more  than  others  on this feature  of  the  environment. While these studies 
attempt to account for the possible endogeneity of the business environment, the extent of their 
control of this issue is limited. 
Finally, a number of firm-level studies have been carried out in the last few years, taking 
advantage of cross-firm variation in performance and in perceived or actual severity of business 
environment  constraints. While  these  studies  represent  an important  advance  over  the  ones 
based  on  more  aggregate  data,  they  also  suffer  from  a  number  of  the  aforementioned 
econometric problems. For example, using a 1995 survey of about 440 firms in Bulgaria and 
Russia, Pissarides et al. (2003) examine the absolute and relative severity of various constraints 
and how it relates to the characteristics of the manager, firm and sector of operation, but they do 
not address the issue of endogeneity of regressors. Johnson et al. (2002a,b) use a 1997 firm-
level survey of about 1,400 firms in five transition economies to estimate the effects of property 
rights  and  access  to  credit  on  profit  reinvestment,  but  also  assume  that  all  regressors  are 
exogenous. Dollar et al. (2005) use surveys from eight developing countries covering nearly 
6500  firms  to  look  at  the  association  between  exporting  and  the  investment  climate.  The 
empirical implementation relies, however, on probit estimations where perceived constraints are 
entered on the right hand and assumed to be exogenous. Beck et al. (2005) use the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) of more than 4,000 firms in 54 countries to examine the 
effect of business environment constraints on firm growth, but do not address endogeneity and 
in most estimations they enter the constraints one at a time rather than simultaneously. The 
authors also do not control for country and industry heterogeneity with country and industry fixed Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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effects,  relying  instead  only  on  country  random  effects  and  a  manufacturing  and  a  services 
dummy  variable.  Ayagari  et  al.  (2005)  examine  the  importance  of  financing  constraints  in 
explaining firm performance using the WBES data for 80 countries, relating firm growth rates to 
the different obstacles that the firms report and assuming that the regressors are exogenous. 
Finally, Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) use an investment climate survey administered in 2000 
to  1,500  Chinese  firms  in  five  cities,  with  some  constraints  being  measured  by  managerial 
perceptions and others by management-provided information on phenomena such as losses in 
sales due to power problems. The authors are concerned with endogeneity, find the instrumental 
variable  approach  infeasible,  and  use  city-industry  average  values  of  the  business  climate 
variables,  together  with  city  information  and  sector  dummies,  to  alleviate  the  endogeneity 
problem.  They  address  the  omitted  variable  problem  by  entering  all  the  constraint  variables 
simultaneously, but firm ownership is treated as exogenous. In short, the literature is rich and 
informative,  but  compared  to  most  other  empirical  literatures  it  is  still  somewhat  tentative 
because of the technical estimation issues discussed above.
4
  
In parallel to the investigations of the effects of business environment, researchers have 
been  analyzing  the  effects  on firm  performance  of  three key  structural  features,  namely  the 
extent  of  firm’s  export  orientation,  competition  and  ownership.  The  number  of  studies  and 
findings is large, but the overall sense is that the performance effects of exports are found to be 
positive,  (see  Tybout,  2003,  for  a  review),  those  of  competition  are  found  to  be  positive  by 
Nickell  (1999),  but  questioned  as  a  uniform  effect  by  Carlin  et  al.  (2004)  and Aghion  et  al. 
(2005), the effect of ownership is found to be, by and large, positive for foreign ownership but 
less clear cut for domestic private ownership.
5
 Interestingly, while these literatures often use the 
same or similar dependent variables, each of them focuses on a particular set of explanatory 
variables and usually does not take into account the explanatory variables deemed important in 
other strands of research. This raises the issue of whether existing studies generate biased 
estimates on account of omitted variables.  
In this paper we carry out an econometric analysis of a large firm-level survey dataset 
                                                 
4    There  are  also  other  conceptual  issues,  noted  for  instance  by  Carlin  et  al  (2006)  who  argue  that  subjective 
evaluations  of  constraints  can  provide  important  insights but  need  to  be  very  carefully  interpreted.  For  example, 
reported constraints for public goods - as against those relating to finance - may require different interpretation as the 
former may act as a common constraint on firms in a country, while the latter may vary between firms, let alone 
between countries. 
5
 Surveys by Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Estrin et al. (2007) point to the positive effect of foreign ownership. 
While Djankov and Murrell (2002) also find a positive effect of domestic private ownership, Estrin et al. (2007) find this 
effect to be much weaker and more varied.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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that includes measures of performance, structural variables related to ownership, competition 
and export orientation, and each firm’s top manager’s perception of the business environment 
that  his/her  firm  faces.  Specifically,  we  use  the  2005  and  2002  Business  Environment  and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank, to examine what robust relationships, if any, can 
be identified by linking firm performance in 26 transition countries to a range of explanatory 
variables,  including  the  firm’s  business  environment,  ownership,  export  orientation,  and 
competition. Aside from providing a large number of observations, over 4,000 firms in 2002 and 
6,600 firms in 2005, the BEEPS dataset also provides us with data on firms over a six-year 
period, as it includes three year retrospective information for each survey round. Our objective is 
to  assess  whether  the  widely  accepted  claim  that  the  business  environment  and  structural 
features of firms are major explanatory factors behind performance is supported in our large 
data set under a series of econometric tests.  
Given the aforementioned analytical issues, we pay attention to the likely problems of 
endogeneity by adopting a number of approaches, including instrumental variables (IVs), and by 
assessing  the  seriousness  of  the  omitted  variable  bias.  We  focus  on  how  efficiently  firms 
generate sales revenue, taking into account inputs of capital and labour. This is equivalent to 
total factor productivity but broader in that it also captures improvements in pricing, marketing 
and other aspects of revenue generation. The reason we use this broader measure is that the 
performance of different types of firms may vary for a number of reasons, including differences 
in, efficiencies in generating output from inputs, abilities to charge high prices due to diverse 
product  quality  or  marketing,  intangible  assets  and  the  cost  of  capital,  location  in  highly 
competitive industries, efficiency of vertical integration, and extent of outsourcing. In order to 
capture as many of these factors as possible, we focus on the revenues of the firm as our 
dependent variable. Our approach explicitly allows for the efficiency of different firms to vary on 
account of any of these factors. We do not presume that firms are in a technical or economic 
steady state but rather that they are trying to improve their performance by discovering new 
methods of production, importing advanced technologies, launching new products, learning new 
managerial and marketing techniques and implementing other changes. The extent to which 
firms  are  able  to  succeed  may,  of  course,  also  depend  on  the  macroeconomic,  legal  and 
institutional environment. The paper focuses on this association – or its absence. 
We find that foreign (but not domestic private) ownership and competition have an impact 
on performance – measured as the level of sales controlling for inputs. Export orientation of the Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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firm does not have an effect on performance once ownership is taken into account. When we 
analyze the impact of perceived constraints, we show that few retain explanatory power once 
they are introduced jointly rather than one at a time, or when country and year fixed effects are 
introduced. Indeed, country fixed effects largely absorb the explanatory power of the constraints 
faced by individual firms. Replicating the analysis with commonly used country-level indicators of 
the  business  environment  (Heritage  Foundation  indices  and  World  Bank’s  Doing  Business 
indicators), we do not find much of a relationship between constraints and performance. Our 
analysis  brings  into  question  an  important  part  of  the  conventional  wisdom  in  this  area.  It 
indicates  that  country  fixed  effects,  reflecting  time-invariant  differences  in  the  business 
environment  but  also  other  factors,  matter  for  firm  performance,  but  that  differences  in  the 
business environment observed within countries across firms do not. Moreover, the limited firm-
and-country-level  variations  in  the  business  environment  over  time  do  not  appear  to  affect 
performance either. This suggests that the effect of business environment on performance and 
the analysts’ ability to identify this effect are more limited than has been widely assumed to date. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the relevant features of the 
transition  economies.  In  Section  3  we  describe  the  data,  while  in  Section  4  we  outline  the 
analytical    framework.    We  present  our  empirical  findings  in  Section  5  and  we  conclude  in 




2.   The Context of Transition 
 
 
At the start of transition, firms were characterised by widespread over-staffing, inefficient 
working  practices,  an  inadequate  emphasis  on  product  quality  and  marketing,  and  limited 
access to modern technology. In addition, firms often received subsidies that allowed them to 
perpetuate inefficiencies and under-performance. Above all, firms were not generally motivated 
by  the  maximisation  of  profit.  Consequently,  transition  has  had  two  main  aspects  –  the 
reallocation of resources from the state to the private sector, and the restructuring of firms to 
raise their efficiency.
6
 With the exception of a small number of countries in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), there has been significant progress in reallocation of resources and 
                                                 
6
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restructuring  across  the  transition  countries.
7
  In  most  transition  countries,  the  private  sector 
accounts for most of GDP and has been the main engine of growth. The private sector has also 
diversified,  with  new  private  firms  entering  alongside  privatised  enterprises,  while  foreign 
investment has also complemented domestic ownership in many countries.  
Earlier research that looked into the determinants of firm performance has found that 
privately owned firms – especially new private firms – have generally performed better. The 
evidence  also  points  to  foreign  participation  and  exposure  to  export  markets  as  factors 
associated with strong performance, whether measured in terms of sales, labour productivity or 
total  factor  productivity  (output  relative  to  labour  and  capital  inputs).
8
  However,  ownership 
change  does  not  appear  to  have  had  any  positive  impact  on  performance  without 
complementary  changes  in  management  structure,  financing,  the  competitive  environment 
and/or  other  factors  specific  to  the  firm.  Further,  some  recent  evidence  has  suggested  that 
privatised domestic firms do not necessarily perform markedly better than the remaining state-
owned  firms.  Moreover,  the  evidence  suggests  that  all  types  of  domestic  firms  in  transition 
countries continue to lag behind their equivalents in advanced market economies.
9
 Domestic 
firms tend to have lower efficiency in generating output from inputs while their scope for raising 
prices may  be  limited  by  product  quality,  poor marketing  and highly  competitive markets.  In 
addition,  they  tend  to  have  fewer  intangible  assets,  greater  vertical  integration  and  higher 
financing costs. Research on the determinants of firm performance has also begun to look at 
how factors external to the firm can also exert an influence on performance. Studies using earlier 
rounds of the BEEPS have suggested that a better business environment can indeed have a 
positive  effect,  although  the  size  –  and  robustness  -  of  that  effect  have  remained  open  to 
question.
10
 Our paper extends this literature by relating firm performance not only to a set of 
ownership variables but also to other key attributes, including perceived constraints, competition 
and export orientation. 
 
                                                 
7
 However, see a recent study by Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) for arguments that the transitional restructuring is not yet 
over. 
8
 See, for example, Carlin (2000), Claessens and Djankov (1999), Frydman et al. (1999), and the EBRD Transition 
Report 1995 and 1999. 
9
 See, for example, Sabirianova et al. (2005) and Hanousek et al. (2007). 
10
 See Carlin et al. (2001). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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3.   Data description 
 
 
We use the 2002 and 2005 rounds of the BEEPS. The BEEPS data are stratified random 
samples  of  firms.  Concerning  ownership,  most  firms  in  the  samples  were  privatised  or  had 
always been private from the start of their operations. However, quota sampling was imposed for 
foreign owned companies (defined as having a foreign stake of at least 50 per cent) and state-
owned companies (defined as the state owning more than 50 percent). These quotas were set 
at 10 per cent of the total sample for each category. The distribution of the sample between 
manufacturing  and  service  sectors  was  determined  according  to  these  sectors’  relative 
contribution to GDP in each country. Firms that operated in sectors subject to government price 
regulation and prudential supervision, such as banking, electric power, rail transport, and water 
were excluded from the sample. As regards size, firms that had 10,000 employees or more were 
excluded from the sample, as were firms that had started operations in 2002, 2003 or 2004. 
Around  90  per  cent  of  the  BEEPS  sample  in  both  years  comprised  small  and  medium 
enterprises.  The  2002  round  of  the  BEEPS  surveyed  over  6,100  firms  from  26  transition 
countries while the 2005 round covered nearly 9,100 firms in the same countries. The summary 
statistics comprising the number of observations, means and standard deviations of the key 
variables are given in Table 1 for the 2002 and 2005 datasets. Values are expressed in US 
dollars.  
As can be seen from Table 1, the key variables display reasonable mean values and 
significant variation. Panel A indicates that the average age of the firm was around 15 years. 
The average firm had between 105 and 145 employees in both surveys. Employment, fixed 
assets,  sales  and  sales  per  worker  had  all  increased  between  1999  and  2002,  as  well  as 
between 2002 and 2005. In the case of employment, growth over these three year periods was 
greater than 30%, while for sales, growth actually decelerated after 2002. The increase in sales 
per worker was roughly equal over both three year periods. The variation in employment, sales 
and capital across firms and in their growth has been substantial, as indicated by the standard 
deviations. Exports have constituted about 10% of sales and there has again been considerable 
variation around the mean in both years. In terms of ownership-related performance statistics 
not reported in Table 1, foreign firms have had about 40 per cent higher levels of sales per 
worker than state-owned firms. Privatised state firms have had around 10 per cent higher levels 
while new private firms have been about 20 per cent higher. Overall, the average foreign firm Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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has produced 20 to 50 per cent more sales revenue and has had 20 to 40 per cent higher 
revenue per worker than the average domestic firm. However, the difference between foreign 




Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive information concerning competition, specifically 
the average number of competitors reported by firms in both 2002 and 2005 disaggregated by 
sector. What emerges is that there is little perceived difference across regions or sectors, as well 
as  little  change  over  the  two  periods.  The  average  number  of  perceived  competitors  falls 
between 2.5 and 3 in each sector, but there is considerable variation within each sector and this 
variation has risen over time. 
Panel  C  of  Table  1  gives  some  indication  of  the  incidence  of  firm  level  changes  or 
initiatives, broken down by the type of initiative. It can be seen that during the three years prior 
to either 2002 or 2005 about one-half of the firms had upgraded an existing product, while over a 
third had developed a new product. Around 30% of firms had introduced new technologies – a 
share  that  varies relatively  little  across  regions  –  while  between 20-30%  of firms  had  either 
changed their main customer or supplier. There is far less evidence of firms seeking quality 
accreditation, joint venturing or use of outsourcing arrangements. Interestingly, no more than 10-
13% of firms had developed exports to new countries. Overall, this suggests that the early phase 
of restructuring in many transition countries has already taken place, except possibly in some 
strategic industries that are under-represented in the sample. Firms have certainly invested in 
changing their product lines and have taken other steps to improve their performance. This in 
turn has likely resulted in a broad range of outcomes. However, particular attributes of firms, 
such as the type of ownership, no longer appear to give a good indication of the expected level 
of restructuring. Further, firms may periodically make adjustments, such as introducing a new 
product,  but  major  restructuring  appears  not  to  be  a  widespread  feature  of  the  transition 
countries.  
Panel  D  of  Table  1  gives  for  2002  and  2005  the  mean  constraint  scores  and  the 
associated standard deviations for the fifteen main constraints that the top manager of each firm 
was asked to evaluate. Individual firm scores for each constraint to doing business range from 1 
{= no obstacle} to 4 {= a major obstacle}. The panel shows considerable variation in the average 
                                                 
 
11 This finding is corroborated by other studies of individual or smaller sets of countries (see, for example, Sabirianova 
et al., 2005). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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value across constraints, ranging from 1.54 in both years for the presence of anti-competitive 
practices  to  2.85  in  2002  for  uncertainty  about  regulatory  policies  and  2.75  in  2005  for  the 
constraining nature of tax rates. There is also considerable variation in the reported values of 
individual constraints across firms, with the standard deviation of the responses being around or 
exceeding 1.0 for all but one constraint (infrastructure) in each year. Averaging the reported 
values of all 15 constraints, the mean score in both years was 2.2 with a standard deviation of 
around 0.7. Further, the variation is considerable when we look for each country and year at the 
average value of the reported constraint at the level of 4 digit NACE industry and across firm 
size.  
As  we  discuss  later,  we  have  also  been  able  to  construct  a  panel  component  of 
approximately 1,300 firms that participated in both the 2002 and 2005 rounds of the BEEPS. 






4.   Analytical framework 
 
In  analyzing  the  determinants  of  the  efficiency  with  which  the  firms  generate  sales 
revenue from inputs, we use an augmented Cobb Douglas revenue function  
ln yit = β0 + ∑ k β k ln x ikt + ρZ it + δI it + θC + ςTt  + vi  + εit,          (1)  
where yit represents the revenue of firm i in period t, x's represent the capital and labor inputs, Zit 
is a vector of the business environment and structural variables (business constraints, export 
orientation of the firm, extent of product market competition and firm ownership), the I's, C’s and 
T’s denote a set of dummy variables for industries, countries and years, respectively, vi is an 
unobserved time-invariant firm-specific effect that we control for in some estimations, and εit is 
an independently distributed error term. Equation (1) allows efficiency to vary across institutional 
and structural variables, industries, countries and time.  
Equation (1) represents our basic specification. We also have access to a measure of 
material inputs which, however, is noisier than the measures of labour and capital. However, to 
                                                 
 
12 To make the matching of the panel firms between 2002 and 2005 datasets possible, the latter includes the variable 
‘seno2002’, comprising the serial numbers of the participating firms from the former survey. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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check  the  robustness  of  our  results,  we  also  estimate  equation  (1)  with  the  left  hand  side 
variable  being  the  log  of  value  added  defined  as  the  difference  between  revenues  and  the 
material input variable. Moreover, as we discuss below, using the panel data we are able to 
provide  estimates  of  an  ‘initial  value’  equation  in  which  we  regress  the  rate  of  change  of 
revenues between 2002 and 2005 on the 2002-05 rate of change of labour and capital and on 
the 2002 levels of the business environment constraints and the structural variables (ownership, 
competition and export orientation). 
In estimating equation (1), the question that naturally arises is how best to control for the 
potential endogeneity/selection issues related to some of the explanatory variables. In particular, 
given the nature of the privatisation process, firm ownership may not be assigned at random, 
and there is generally a need to account for possible unobserved heterogeneity and to isolate 
the  effect  of  inputs,  perceived  business  environment  and  structural  factors  on  a  firm’s 
performance  from  the  effects  of  performance  on  these  explanatory  variables.
13
  We  use  an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach, noting that we are fortunate that the BEEPS data contain a 
large number of firms as IV estimates are consistent but not unbiased. However, controlling 
adequately for endogeneity is not an easy task in survey data such as ours that do not come 
from a natural experiment. We use several complementary approaches to estimate the average 
effect of the explanatory variables on performance. First, for several key variables, the 2002 and 
2005 samples provide information on the rate of change between 1999 and 2002, and between 
2002 and 2005, so that we can use lagged three-year differences in some of these variables as 
potential instrumental variables for our cross sectional analysis of the 2002 and 2005 levels of 
variables.  For  each  year  in  each  firm,  we  also  have  data  on  the  number  of  workers  with 
university and secondary education and following Marschak and Andrews (1944) and Schmidt 
(1988), we can use the ratio of these two inputs (skill ratio) as an instrumental variable.
14
 The 
use of a skill ratio relies on the exogeneity of the ratio of wages of the more and less educated 
workers at the firm-level, and on variation in this wage ratio across regions and countries. Since 
firms in our survey operate in very different regions and countries, the ratio of wages of workers 
with greater and lesser education is likely to vary considerably across our observations.  
                                                 
13
 Gupta et al. (2000), for instance, show that better performing firms tend to be privatised first while Sabirianova et al. 
(2005) find that foreign firms acquire better-performing domestic firms. 
14
 The rationale for this instrument comes from economic optimization and an assumed exogeneity of input prices 
(wages). In particular, if the production function is Cobb-Douglas and the firm maximizes profit or minimizes cost, the 
first order conditions dictate that the ratio of inputs equal the ratio of input prices and technological parameters. If the 
firm is a price taker in the input market, the ratio of inputs reflects these exogenous factors. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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Given  that  the  bias of two-stage least  squares  is  proportional  to  the degree  of  over-
identification, our approach has been to estimate the first stage regressions with as few IVs as 
possible, while ensuring that the IVs have adequate explanatory power and  pass the over-
identification tests. In particular, we start by estimating equation (1) in levels on the pooled 2002 
and 2005 samples of firms and we use as IVs the age and location of the firm, the skill ratio 
interacted with the three main regions covered by our data
15
 the skill ratio interacted with firm 
age and the three regions, a three-year lagged number of full time employees, the change in 
fixed assets in the preceding three years, and the change in the export share over the preceding 
three  years. We  use  these  variables  as  instruments for  the levels  of the  capital  and  labour 
inputs, categories of ownership and the export orientation of the firm. We find that these IVs are 
good  predictors  of  all  the  potentially  endogenous  variables  and  pass  the  J  (Sargan)  over-
identification test.
16
 We treat the extent of competition in the firm’s product market as exogenous 
to a given firm.  
Finally, in order to assess the robustness of our results with respect to the business 
environment (institutional) constraints, we have estimated these effects in several ways. First, 
we have carried out estimations using the individual values of the constraints directly as reported 
by the top managers of the interviewed firms. This approach has the advantage that it provides a 
direct firm-specific measure and generates high variance in the values of these variables, but it 
may generate biased estimates if a manager’s perception of the severity of constraints is, for 
instance,  influenced  by  the  performance  of  his/her  firm.
17
  Second,  in  order  to  address  this 
potential  endogeneity  bias,  we  have  carried  out  estimations  in  which  we  instrument  the 
individual managers’ values of constraints with the above mentioned, as well as other IVs. Third, 
we have used an average value of each constraint reported by other firms, where the average is 
based on responses either by all other firms in a given industry in each country and year, or by 
all other firms of a given size in a given industry in each country and year. The advantage of 
using the responses of other firms that are subject to the same external shocks is that the value 
                                                 
15  The regions are (a) Central Europe and Baltics, (b) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and (c) 
Southeastern Europe.  
16
 The summary statistics from the first stage estimates are reported in the tables with the second stage results. 
Complete results of the first stage regressions are available on request. Given the choice of IVs, the need to address 
the endogeneity issue is also indicated by the Hausman-Wu F tests and Durbin-Hausman-Wu Chi square tests that 
suggest that the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the regressors is rejected in our data.  
 
17
 For example, managers of efficient firms operate near full capacity and feel constrained, while managers of poorly 
performing firms may have considerable unused capacity and do not find many constraints binding. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
   
  17 
 
of the constraint is not affected by the firm’s own performance. It turns out that the estimates 
based on all the above approaches are similar, with estimates based on the average value of 
constraints reported by other firms of a given size in a given NACE 2 digit industry in each 
country  and  year  being  slightly  more  frequently  significant  than  others.  Since  our  analysis 
suggests that the literature has overstated the significance of the effect of business constraints 
on  firm  performance,  in  what  follows  we  report  the  set  of  estimates  that  are  most  likely  to 
generate significant estimates of the business constraints (i.e., provide the greatest support for 
the existing literature and go most against our thesis), namely estimates based on the average 
values of constraints reported each year by other firms within a given 2 digit industry and firm 
size  category  (small,  medium  and  large)  in  a  given  country.  This  approach  gives  both  a 
considerable variation in the values of constraints and a sufficient number of firms per cell to 
minimise  problems  associated  with  potential  measurement  error.  The  standard  errors  of  all 
estimates are clustered by year, country, industry and firm size.  
Our second approach is to use the smaller panel data set that we have constructed from 
the 2002 and 2005 BEEPS surveys to explain the three-year rate of change in performance. For 
this  analysis  we  have  over  600  firms  and  as  we  discuss  below,  the  sample  is  relatively 
representative  of  the  larger  cross  section  of  firms.  The  panel  data  generate  broadly  similar 
estimates as the entire pooled cross sectional sample, suggesting that the panel dataset is a 
usable subset of the entire sample. Using the panel data we estimate an equation in which we 
regress the rate of change of revenues between 2002 and 2005 on the 2002-05 rate of change 
of  labour  and  capital,  and  on  the  2002  levels  of  the  business  environment  constraints  and 
structural variables. This ‘initial value’ regression parallels the specification used by Levine and 
Zervos  (1998)  at  the  macro  level  and  allows  us  to  ask  the  question  of  how  initial  (2002) 
conditions affect the subsequent (2002-05) rate of change of performance.
18
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  principal  variables  whose  performance  effect  we  analyse 
include the intensity of the various constraints reported by the firms, firm ownership, the extent of 
competition faced by the firm, and the extent of exporting carried out by the firm. In addition, 
coefficients on country dummy variables provide an estimate of the effect on efficiency of the 
business environment at the country level. We also apply a sector fixed effect in the estimations 
reported below and, where possible, a year dummy. 
                                                 
18
 This is about as far as we can go in estimation, however, since for most firms we have data on the percentage 
change in revenues between 2002 and 2005, but we lack 2002-05 rate of change  observations for many of the 
explanatory variables. For instance, we cannot estimate equation (1) in first differences. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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5.   Effects of Ownership, Competition, Exports and Business 
Environment 
5.1 Level of Efficiency 
 
 
Table 2 contains our baseline IV estimates without the explanatory variables capturing 
the business environment (institutional) constraints. These regressions use pooled data from the 
entire  2002  and  2005 BEEPS  and  correspond  to  studies  that  have  examined  the  efficiency 
effects of exporting, competition and firm ownership. The number of observations varies from 
5,624 to 5,897, depending on specification, and the results are therefore based on the largest 
data set available to us. All regressions include country, year and sector fixed effects. State 
ownership serves as the reference and the coefficients on other ownership categories hence 
reflect the log point differential effect relative to state ownership.  
Column 1 reports a base estimate where just the two factors – labour and capital – are 
included. The labour coefficient is relatively small and not statistically significant but, as we show 
presently, it is larger and significant in the more preferred models that we run. Column 2 adds in 
the ratio of exports to sales and this variable enters positively and significantly. Columns 3 and 4 
introduce the competition variable – defined as 1 if the firm has three or more competitors and 0 
otherwise. Entered alone with the inputs the coefficient is positive, but small and insignificant. 
This is also the case when competition is entered alongside the export share and controlling for 
inputs. The coefficient on the export share remains large and highly significant. Columns 5-8 
introduce the ownership variables. In these specifications the labour and capital coefficients are 
both positive and statistically significant, and their sum approaches unity. It is of interest to note 
that the coefficients on both the privatised and new private firms are negative and, in the latter 
case, marginally significant in two of the four specifications. By contrast, foreign ownership has a 
large and positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. The positive effect of foreign 
ownership is maintained but the significance of the negative effect of new private ownership 
disappears when the export share and competition variables are entered. Interestingly, when we 
control for ownership, the export share variable loses all significance. In columns 7 and 8, where 
most or all the explanatory variables are entered simultaneously, we find that competition has a 
small, positive and significant (at 10-11% level) impact on performance with foreign ownership 
exerting a strong and positive impact on performance as well. Being privatised or being a new 
private firm remains negatively signed but insignificant relative to the reference of stateowned Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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firms. The augmented specifications in columns 5-8 also generate acceptable values of the J 
and F tests related to the selection of IVs in the first stage of estimation. Our preferred (all-
encompassing) specification in column 8 points to the importance of foreign ownership and to a 
lesser extent competition on performance. The corresponding value added regressions, reported 
in Appendix Table A1, yield qualitatively similar results except that the estimated coefficient on 
competition,  while  positive,  is  not  statistically  significant.  (In  what  follows,  we  do  not  report 
additional value added regressions because they generate results that are similar to those in the 
revenue regressions.) 
Having estimated the base performance equation, we proceed to consideringdirectly the 
impact of business environment constraints on firm performance. As mentioned above, for each 
constraint we use the average of responses of other firms in the same 2 digit sector, firm size 
(small, medium and large), country and year throughout the analysis, with the other unreported 
specifications yielding similar results. Entering all 15 categories of constraints invariably yields 
insignificant  estimates  and  the  question  naturally  arises  as  to  whether  collinearity  across 
constraints induces this insignificance of results. We have examined the relationships among the 
various constraints and we report the key findings in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. As may 
be seen from  the  correlation matrix  in Table A2, most  constraints  are  not  highly correlated, 
although several pairs display high correlation (e.g., access to financing and cost of financing, 
tax  rates  and  tax  administration,  uncertainty  about  regulatory  policies  and  macroeconomic 
instability, and street crime and organized crime). This pairwise correlation is also detected in an 
ANOVA regression that we have run to assess the extent to which the variation in the value of 
any given constraint can be explained by the other constraints. In what follows, we enter only 
one of these pairwise correlated constraint variables, noting that it generally does not matter 
which of the two is entered. We also exclude the constraint related to labour regulation as it is 
almost  completely  explained  by  the  interaction  of  country  and  year  fixed  effects  and  hence 
insignificant. This leaves us with nine constraints whose effects we analyze in the remainder of 
the paper. As may be seen from Table A3, the partial correlation coefficients among these nine 
constraints  are  relatively  low  and  the  total  R  squared  in  the  reported  regressions  of  each 
constraint on others is at or below 0.4 in all except one regression (corruption), where it is at 
0.48. When we add country, year and sector fixed effects to the regressions in Table A3, we 
increase the  R  squared  in  the  constraints  regressions  to  0.41-0.57. Finally,  adding  all other 
regressors  from  the  IV  revenue  regressions  raises  the  R  squared  to  0.44-0.73.  Collinearity 
among  the  constraints  is  hence  limited  but  becomes  somewhat  more  pronounced  for  some Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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constraints when all the regressors are considered simultaneously. 
Table  3  provides  a  first  pass  at  including  the  nine  constraints  in  the  performance 
regression -- individually (Columns 1-9), as an average of all nine constraints (Column 10) and 
with all nine constraints entered together (Column 11). Despite the obvious omitted variable 
problem, we report the specifications with the constraints entered one at a time because this 
approach has been used frequently in the literature and much of the accepted wisdom on the 
effects of institutions and regulation on performance derives from these types of specifications. 
In line with a large part of the literature, the regressions in Table 3 are without country, year and 
sector fixed effects (note that this model appears to be mis-specified compared to a model that 
includes  these  fixed  effects  (Table  4  below)  in  that  the  labour  coefficient  is  small  and 
insignificant, and the p values on the J test are very small). It can be seen that when entered 
individually, all except one of the constraints enter negatively – as would be expected - and most 
are significant at 1% or 5% levels. In these specifications, we hence replicate the conventional 
wisdom  obtained  in  many  studies  that  the  business/institutional  environment  matters.  The 
regression with the average value of all nine constraints, proxying the overall severity of the 
business environment, also yields a negative and statistically significant coefficient. When all the 
constraints  are  entered  simultaneously  in  the  IV  estimation  in  Table  3,  however,  the 
infrastructure and to a lesser extent tax rate and macro instability constraints remain negative 
and significant, but others lose significance or, in the case of crime, theft and disorder, become 
positive  and  significant.  Hence,  when  we  correct  at  least  in  part  for  the  possible  omitted 
variables problem, the negative effect of most business environment 
constraints on performance disappears. As may be seen from Table A4 in the appendix, the 
corresponding OLS estimates are very similar for the individually entered constraints (Columns 
1-10) and they differ only slightly when all the constraints are entered simultaneously (Column 
11) in that 4 of the 9 constraints retain a negative coefficient. 
Table 4 repeats the same exercise but includes country, year and sector fixed effects 
whose omission may have biased the estimates in Table 3. In this case, the significance of the 
coefficients  on  inputs,  ownership,  exports  and  competition  correspond  to  those  in  the  base 
estimations in Table 2 – foreign ownership and having three or more competitors exert a positive 
and  significant  impact, while  export  orientation  does  not  and  the  effect of  new  private firms 
becomes  negative  and  statistically  significant  in  some  specifications.  However,  the  picture 
changes substantially with respect to the business environment constraints. While most of the 
constraints  terms  entered  individually  retain  their  negative  sign,  only  one  –  corruption  --  is Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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significant. The effect of the average of all constraints, reported in Column 10, is statistically 
insignificant, as are all the constraint coefficients in Column 11 where all constraints are entered 
simultaneously.  The  corresponding  OLS  estimates  in  Table  A5  are  similar  in  that  only  one 
constraint – this time crime – has a significant negative coefficient when the constraints are 
entered  individually,  and  only  one  has  a  significant  (but  positive)  coefficient  when  all  the 
constraints are entered simultaneously. An examination of the role played by the country, year 
and sector effects indicates that it is the country as well as country cum year fixed effects in 
particular that serve to knock out the significance of the individual (and in the case of OLS also 
the  jointly  entered)  constraints.  Hence,  once  we  control  for  countrywide  differences  in  the 
‘business environment’ (together with aggregate shocks and other effects), the negative effects 
of most constraints disappear. 
We have also extended the analysis by looking at the possible impact that interactions of 
constraints  might  have  on  performance,  in  line  with  recent  explorations  in  the  development 
literature (see e.g., Aghion et al., 2005, 2006). The intuition here is that, say, corruption may or 
may not have a direct impact itself, but it may exert an effect through its association with other 
constraints  related  to  government  policies  and  regulations,  such  as  the  functioning  of  the 
judiciary, uncertainty about regulatory policies, labour regulations, business licensing, and tax 
administration and tax rates. To explore whether this is indeed the case we have augmented the 
base model with interactions of constraints that may be hypothesised to be related. For example, 
in  Table  5  we  report  the  results  of  interacting  corruption  with  functioning  of  the  judiciary, 
uncertainty  about  regulatory  policies,  labour  regulations,  business  licensing,  and  tax 
administration and tax rates. As may be seen from the table, neither when the interactions are 
entered one at a time, nor when they are all entered simultaneously, do we find statistically 
significant results. The results in Table 5 are representative in that we were unable to find any 
robust evidence for other interactions either.  
In another set of extensions, we have explored the idea of heterogeneity across regions 
and examined whether significant results can be obtained if we estimate the models separately 
within each of the three main regions covered by our data – Central Europe and the Baltics 
(CEB), South-eastern Europe (SEE) and the CIS. The findings from these estimations allow the 
slope coefficients to vary by region and they are similar to those presented for the sample as a 
whole.  When  the  country,  year  and  sector  fixed  effects  are  excluded,  few  constraints  are 
significant and a number of the signs are counter-intuitive. When the country, year and sector 
fixed effects are included, virtually all constraints lose significance.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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One important result that we are obtaining in our analysis is that country differences, 
presumably  in  the  overall  business  environment  but  also  in  other  aspects,  matter  for  firm 
performance  while  the  within-country  cross-firm  differences  do  not.  Closer  inspection  of  the 
country fixed effects reveals that while not all are significant, the ranking of countries that occurs 
corresponds to a significant extent to what might be expected from other indicators, such as the 
EBRD transition indicators.
19
 That is, the ranking for instance mostly confirms that firms in the 
Central European countries have higher average levels of efficiency than either those from SEE 
or the CIS. However, the rankings are not stable and have a number of unexpected features. 
For instance, Serbia and Macedonia consistently rank above the most economically advanced 
(EU accession) countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. This suggests that 
the country effects are also capturing other sources of heterogeneity, such as differences in 
accounting and reporting systems. For these very reasons, it is desirable to control for country 
effects, realizing that they capture many features of heterogeneity, rather than excluding them or 
attributing the cross-country heterogeneity to just a single factor, such as a particular aspect of 
the business environment. 
 
5.2 Using Heritage Foundation and Doing Business Indicators 
 
 
In view of our findings based on manager perceptions of the business environment, a 
question  arises  as  to  whether  the  findings  are  robust  in  that  other  measures  of  the 
business/institutional environment would produce similar results. To answer this question, we 
have examined the effects that widely used indices of the business environment and institutions 
have when combined with our firm-level data.
20
 In particular, we have merged our firm-level data 
with the 10 indices of economic freedom produced by the Heritage Foundation – trade tariffs, tax 
rates,  government  intervention,  monetary  policy  (inflation),  restrictions  on  foreign  direct 
investment,  banking/finance  sector  restrictions,  wage/price  controls,  property  rights  issues, 
business and other regulations, and the extent of informal markets. As an alternative, we have 
also used 12 of the Doing Business indicators produced by the World Bank. These are, the 
number of procedures to register a business, time to register a business, cost of registering a 
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business, rigidity of employment regulations, restrictions on firing workers, cost of firing a worker, 
number of procedures to enforce a contract payment after default, time to enforce a contract 
payment  after  default,  cost  of  enforcing  a  contract  payment  after  default,  time  to  effectuate 
bankruptcy, cost of effectuating bankruptcy, and recovery rate in a bankruptcy. The Heritage 
Foundation indices are measured on a 1-5 scale (1 =best/most free and 5 = worst/least free), 
while the Doing Business indicators are on a 1-100 scale or have a natural value (days, number 
of procedures, etc.). The data for the Heritage Foundation relate to 2001 and 2004, while those 
for Doing Business were published in 2003 and 2006 (and collected mostly in 2002 and 2005).
21
  
  When we enter the Heritage Foundation indices of regulation one at a time into our OLS 
regressions without country, industry and year fixed effects, the indices all produce the expected 
negative effects of regulation/constraints on firm performance, as does a simple average index 
of these 10 indices (columns 1-10 in Appendix Table A6). When the ten indices are entered 
simultaneously in column 11 of Table A6, five retain negative coefficients, two coefficients turn 
positive, and three become statistically insignificant. Our data hence reproduce the traditional 
result that when the Heritage indicators are entered one at a time in an OLS regression, they 
show  a  strong  negative  effect  of  regulation  on  performance.  The  effects  are  quite  mixed, 
however, when the indicators are entered jointly. 
A major empirical and policy issue arises from the fact that the values of the individual 
Heritage Foundation indicators are highly correlated over time. For the two years that we use, 
these indicators for our 27 countries have a correlation that ranges between 0.91 (government 
intervention) and 0.99 (business and other regulation). This means that the indicators are close 
to being indistinguishable from country fixed effects. Indeed, when we run the OLS regressions 
with country, industry and year fixed effects, and the Heritage Foundation indicators are entered 
one at a time, two of the ten indicators retain negative coefficients, one becomes positive and 
seven  become  statistically  insignificant  (columns  1-10  in  Appendix  Table  A7).  When  all  the 
indicators are entered simultaneously, two coefficients are negative, three are positive and five 
are insignificant (column 11 in Table A7).  
When we use the Heritage Foundation indicators in our IV regressions, with or without 
country, industry and year fixed effects, the coefficients of the individual Heritage Foundation 
indicators all become insignificant when entered individually, and they produce three negative, 
one  to  three  positive  and  four  to  six  insignificant  coefficients  when  entered  simultaneously. 
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Moreover, the coefficients that are negative are not the same ones in the various specifications. 
For the  sake of  brevity,  we  report in  Table  6 the  results for the IV  estimation  with country, 
industry and year fixed effects, noting that the estimates in the regressions without these fixed 
effects are similar. In sum, specifications other than a simple OLS model with each Heritage 
Foundation constraint entered individually basically fail to generate the expected negative effect 
of regulation/constraints indicators on firm performance.
22
 
        As may be seen from Appendix Table A8, when we use the Doing Business indicators 
and enter them one at a time, the OLS regressions without country, industry and year fixed 
effects generate seven coefficients that are negative, three that are positive and two that are 
statistically  insignificant.  When  all  the  business  environment  indicators  are  entered 
simultaneously, six coefficients are negative, five are positive and one is statistically insignificant. 
In these “basic” specifications, the Doing Business indicators hence generate less support for 
the expected negative effects of regulations/constraints on firm performance than the Heritage 
Foundation indices.  
        The  Doing  Business  indicators  are  potentially  more  interesting  than  the  Heritage 
Foundation indices for the fixed effects regressions, however, because some are less correlated 
over time -- the correlation coefficients range from 0.84 for time to start a business to almost 1.0 
for contracts procedures. Yet, as may be seen from Appendix Table A9, when we enter the 
Doing Business indicators individually into the OLS regressions with country, industry and year 
fixed  effects,  four  coefficients  are  negative,  one  is  positive  and  seven  are  statistically 
insignificant.  When  we  enter  the  indicators  simultaneously,  three  are  negative  and  nine  are 
insignificant. Of the three indicators that have a correlation of the 2003 and 2006 values below 
0.9 (time to register a business, cost of registering a business, and restrictions on firing workers), 
two generate a negative effect and one a positive effect when entered individually, while one 
produces  a  negative  coefficient  and  two  produce  an  insignificant  coefficient  when  entered 
simultaneously.  The  OLS  results  in  Appendix  Table  A9  are  hence  quite  mixed  and  do  not 
provide much support for the hypothesis that greater regulation impedes firm performance. 
       When  we  introduce  the  Doing Business  indicators  into  our  IV  regressions,  we  obtain 
similarly mixed results. In the specification with country, industry and year fixed effects (Table 7), 
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only  four  of  the  twelve  indicators  generate  the  expected  negative  coefficients.  In  the  IV 
regressions  without  fixed  effects  (not  reported  in  tabular  form  here)  only  two  of  the  twelve 
indicators have negative effects. Moreover, the indicators with the negative coefficients are not 
the same ones across specifications.  
       Overall,  our  results  indicate  that  the  widely  used  country-level  indicators  of 
business/institutional  environment  do  not  provide  much  evidence  of  a  negative  relationship 
between constraining environment and firm performance. Some of these indicators, particularly 
the  Heritage  Foundation  indices,  produce  evidence  consistent  with  this  hypothesis  in  the 
simplest  OLS  specifications  when  the  indices  are  entered  one  at  a  time,  but  not  in  the 
specifications  when  the  indices  are  entered  jointly  or  models  that  control  for  other  relevant 
factors. 
5.3 Rate of Growth of Revenues 
 
 
Having  looked  at  the  effects  of  the  constraints  and  the  structural  variables  capturing 
ownership,  export  orientation  and  competition  on  the  level  of  revenue  efficiency,  we  next 
address the question of whether these variables have any effect on the rate of change in the 
revenue  efficiency  of  firms.  These  “initial  value”  regressions  are  estimated  on  the  smaller 
number of firms in the panel data set. We have checked the comparability of the panel to the 
larger data set by comparing summary statistics and we have also replicated on the panel data 
the same base estimations as we present for the pooled cross sectional data in Table 2. These 
base estimations performed on the panel data are reported in Appendix Table A10. 
In Table  8  we report the  results  of relating the  2002-05  rate of  change  of  real sales 
revenues  to  the  lagged  (2002)  levels  of  the  ownership,  competition,  export  orientation,  and 
constraint variables, controlling for the rate of change in labour and capital over the same period. 
By construction, these “initial value” regressions eliminate the possibility that the relationship 
between  efficiency,  constraints  and  the  structural  variables  is  brought  about  by 
contemporaneous shocks to these variables. Estimation in this instance is by OLS with country, 
sector  and  year  fixed  effects  included.  While  foreign  ownership  enters  positively  and  the 
coefficient on new private ownership tends to be negative as before, we do not find evidence for 
any  type  of  ownership  having  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  the  rate  of  change  of 
performance. Export orientation  enters  positively  and is  statistically  insignificant,  and  we are Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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unable to find any impact from competition. As to the business/institutional constraints, none of 
the variables generate a significant negative effect, whether entered individually or jointly and 
the size of the estimated coefficients tends to be small. We hence find no evidence that the level 
of perceived constraints matters for subsequent rate of change of performance. In particular, the 
different aspects of the business environment, as measured by these reported constraints, do 





6.   Conclusions 
 
It has become almost fashionable in recent years to argue that the businessenvironment 
plays a major role in determining the overall strength of a given economy, primarily through its 
impact on the performance of firms. ’Bad’ business environments – commonly characterised as 
those in  which, for  example,  corruption  and regulation is  high  and  where  there is  pervasive 
uncertainty with respect to taxation, business licensing or even macroeconomic policy -- are 
widely believed to cause poor economic performance. The evidence for such conclusions has 
indeed been drawn from a variety of sources, including cross-country estimations of growth but 
also,  increasingly,  from  firm  level  surveys  that  have  gathered  subjective  information  on 
perceived constraints to activity emanating from the business environment. However, while the 
general thrust of the argument – that the business environment is an important determinant of 
economic performance – carries considerable intuitive appeal, the importance of establishing the 
hypothesised relationship through careful analysis of data cannot be emphasised enough. A 
similar  reasoning  applies  to  the  relatively  broadly  accepted  notion  that  private  ownership  of 
basically any kind generates superior performance to state ownership of firms. Indeed, a certain 
amount of the recent research in this area using aggregate and firm-level survey evidence may 
be misleading  through its reliance  on  relatively  simple  econometric implementation  that may 
suffer from biases due to omitted variables, measurement error and endogeneity.  
In this paper we have addressed the challenge by using firm-level information – in this 
case  the  large  BEEPS  dataset  –  to  analyze  the  performance  effects  of  firm’s  ownership, 
competition,  export  orientation  and  the  business  (institutional)  environment.  To  that  end,  we 
have  employed  a variety  of  approaches,  including instrumental  variables  and  using  average Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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values of constraints reported by other firms with similar characteristics. We find that there is 
evidence that ownership and competition exert an impact on performance, but the results differ 
from much of the earlier literature in that foreign ownership of firms has a positive effect on 
performance but domestic private ownership does not. Export orientation of the firm is found to 
have a positive effect on performance in simple specifications but the effect disappears once 
firm  ownership  is  taken  into  account.  When  we  examine  the  impact  of  perceived  business 
environment  constraints,  we  find  that  few  retain  explanatory  power,  in  either  IV  or  OLS 
specification, once they are entered simultaneously rather than one at a time, or once country, 
year and sector fixed effects are introduced. Indeed, country fixed effects largely absorb the 
explanatory power of the constraints in all specifications. In neither the level equations nor in the 
“initial value” rates of change regressions can we identify any strong and robust effects of these 
variables. The lack of a detectable effect of the reported severity of various constraints in the 
business environment could reflect the fact that (a) firms can get around these constraints at a 
relatively low cost and the effect is hence not detectable in the data (e.g., the firms must pay a 
bribe to obtain a license but the cost of the bribe is small), or (b) managers who face severe 
constraints compensate for the presence of these constraints and report lower severity than is 
actually the case (e.g., firms that need more acutely external financing “pre-save” from retained 
earnings  in  the  presence  of  financing  constraints  and  report  lower  severity  of  the  financing 
constraint than is in fact the case because they pre-saved and do not need as much external 
financing as they would otherwise). Since we observe significant variation in reported constraints 
across firms, the latter phenomenon (compensating for constraints) may reduce the observed 
effect of constraints but should not eliminate it altogether.  
In order to see if the overall results are brought about by some peculiarity of our business 
environment data, we have also replicated the level equations using the country level indicators 
of  the business  environment  provided by  the  Heritage  Foundation  and  the World  Bank. We 
again do not detect a systematic relationship between constraints and performance. 
Overall, we show that country effects, reflecting differences in the business environment 
but  also  other  factors,  matter  for  firm  performance  but  that  differences  in  the  business 
environment constraints observed across firms within countries do not. Moreover, the limited 
firm- and country-level variations in the business environment over time do not appear to affect 
performance either. A closer inspection of the country fixed effects reveals that they are to some 
extent correlated with the expected differences in corporate performance but that they are also 
likely to be capturing other sources of crosscountry heterogeneity. Our analysis hence brings Studies & Analyses CASE No. 344 – Do Institutions, Ownership, Exporting and Competition … 
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into question an important part of the conventional wisdom in this area. It suggests that the 
effect of business environment on performance and the analysts’ ability to identify this effect are 
more limited than has been widely assumed in the analytical and policy work to date. It indicates 
that it is important to control for country effects, realizing that they capture many features of 
heterogeneity, rather than excluding them or attributing the cross-country heterogeneity to just a 
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2002 2005
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Sales                                             4504 2290 10428 6665 3376 17503
Employment                                        6122 143 505 9097 105 364
Fixed Assets                                      3388 2384 33893 4637 1622 10582
Number of Competitors                             6029 0.82 0.39 8479 0.82 0.39
Ownership [Privatization]                         6153 0.15 0.36 9098 0.14 0.35
Ownership [New Private]                           6153 0.55 0.50 9098 0.66 0.47
Ownerschip [State]                                6153 0.14 0.35 9098 0.09 0.28
Ownership [Other]                                 6153 0.02 0.12 9098 0.01 0.09
Ownership [Foreign]                               6153 0.14 0.35 9098 0.10 0.30
Exports as % of Sales                             6055 11.16 25.05 9039 8.76 22.34
Workforce Ratio: University / Secondary Education 5289 1.36 4.67 6930 1.24 3.83
Company Age                                       6153 14.70 18.70 9090 15.55 17.46
University / Secondary Education x Age            5289 19.47 114.49 6925 22.84 124.76
Permanent Employment 3 years ago                  6066 134.73 501.85 8967 101.51 405.07
Parttime Employment 3 Years ago                   5872 6.96 44.21 8873 5.65 31.70
% change in Fixed Assets (3 year period)            5717 16.30 46.66 8787 11.90 32.17
% change in Exports (3 year period)                 6026 5.44 33.76 9030 4.44 29.81
% change in Employment (3 year period)              6059 34.89 135.99 8967 30.30 133.53
% change in Sales (3 year period)                   5832 21.69 62.74 8764 12.99 39.25
% change in Sales per Worker (3 year period)        5753 14.69 74.90 8645 12.35 89.17
Panel B:  Average number of Competitors
Construction 772 2.85 0.39 443 2.86 0.41
Manufacturing 1463 2.72 0.49 2161 2.75 0.49
Transport, Storage & Communic 474 2.72 0.52 339 2.79 0.47
Wholesale & Retail Trade 1847 2.88 0.34 949 2.84 0.40
Real Estate Renting & Business Services 637 2.82 0.41 396 2.82 0.45
Other Services 768 2.81 0.43 317 2.74 0.53
Others 68 2.53 0.63 60 2.53 0.68
Panel C: Share of companies taking initiatives
Change main supplier 6079 0.28 0.45 9098 0.28 0.45
Change main customer 6096 0.23 0.42 9098 0.22 0.41
Export to new country 6153 0.13 0.34 9098 0.10 0.30
Develop major new product 6153 0.39 0.49 9098 0.35 0.48
Upgrading an existing product 6153 0.52 0.50 9098 0.51 0.50
Discontinued at least 1 product 6110 0.21 0.41 9098 0.16 0.37
Joint venture with foreign partner  6153 0.09 0.28 9098 0.04 0.20
New product licensing agreement 6153 0.19 0.39 9098 0.13 0.34
Outsorced a major production 6106 0.08 0.28 9098 0.08 0.27
Quality accreditation 6153 0.14 0.35 9098 0.12 0.33
None of the previous 6149 0.15 0.36 9098 0.23 0.42
Brought in-house a major production 6109 0.08 0.28 9098 0.07 0.26
Opening new plant 6110 0.14 0.35 n.a n.a n.a
Close existing plant 6103 0.12 0.32 n.a n.a n.a
Introduced a new technology 6115 0.30 0.46 n.a n.a n.a
Panel D: Average constraints
Access to financing                    5810 2.33 1.16 8647 2.26 1.14
Cost of financing                      5864 2.53 1.13 8698 2.51 1.13
Tax rates                              6060 2.76 1.11 8951 2.75 1.10
Tax administration                     5953 2.54 1.14 8895 2.47 1.13
Custom/foreign trade regulations       5649 2.04 1.12 8267 1.91 1.07
Business licencing & permit            5906 2.02 1.08 8776 1.98 1.04
Labour regulations                     5946 1.74 0.94 8886 1.87 0.98
Uncertainty about regulatory policies  6000 2.85 1.09 8819 2.53 1.12
Macroeconomic instability              5998 2.76 1.11 8823 2.52 1.12
Functioning of the judiciary           5728 2.06 1.08 8417 2.06 1.10
Corruption                             5713 2.24 1.16 8497 2.16 1.14
Street crime theft & disorder          5857 1.96 1.07 8661 1.82 1.01
Organised crime mafia                  5663 1.81 1.09 8394 1.64 0.97
Anti-competitive practices             5871 2.25 1.11 8739 2.30 1.11
Infrastructure                         6122 1.54 0.70 9043 1.54 0.73
Average of all constraints             6134 2.24 0.67 9064 2.17 0.66
* n.a.: information not available
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
  
12345678
Log Employment 0.189 0.190 0.203 0.236 0.449 0.466 0.508 0.503
[0.177] [0.177] [0.170] [0.163] [0.184]** [0.200]** [0.179]*** [0.188]***
Log Assets 0.904 0.880 0.891 0.826 0.522 0.498 0.467 0.470
[0.190]*** [0.190]*** [0.182]*** [0.177]*** [0.192]*** [0.213]** [0.189]** [0.201]**
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 0.743 0.981 -0.540 -0.218
[0.359]** [0.392]** [0.493] [0.506]
More than 3 Competitors 0.040 0.066 0.072 0.075
[0.052] [0.050] [0.044]* [0.046]
Ownership [Privatized] -0.435 -0.205 -0.222 -0.159
[0.428] [0.423] [0.384] [0.405]
Ownership [New Private] -0.531 -0.523 -0.408 -0.424
[0.284]* [0.283]* [0.258] [0.263]
Ownership [Foreign] 1.196 1.728 1.388 1.591
[0.367]*** [0.544]*** [0.350]*** [0.520]***
Constant 0.513 0.520 0.488 0.523 1.430 1.422 1.281 1.283
[0.231]** [0.231]** [0.248]** [0.240]** [0.423]*** [0.439]*** [0.400]*** [0.416]***
Observations 5897 5844 5677 5624 5897 5844 5677 5624
J-Test 17.78 14.12 16.89 12.16 3.19 1.58 1.50 0.95
p-value 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.016 0.527 0.209 0.472 0.328
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 326.02 322.82 311.13 307.83 326.02 322.82 311.13 307.83
Log Assets 135.40 134.22 125.73 124.50 135.40 134.22 125.73 124.50
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 57.07 59.51 57.07 59.51
Ownership [Privatized] 46.69 46.55 45.11 45.04
Ownership [New Private] 128.52 129.01 122.58 123.05
Ownership [Foreign] 21.48 20.37 20.86 19.73
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test  63.55 72.73 66.95 76.99 81.08 82.18 81.38 78.31
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Revenue Efficiency - Baseline Regressions                                                                         
(IV Estimation with Year, Country  and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for log Employment, log Assets, log(1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership 
Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in 
fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill 
ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies   
123456789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.079 0.067 0.064 0.079 0.081 0.088 0.044 0.063 0.077 0.073 0.109
[0.100] [0.102] [0.103] [0.109] [0.108] [0.106] [0.109] [0.108] [0.103] [0.101] [0.118]
Log Fixed Assets 0.941 0.963 0.97 0.947 0.945 0.953 0.965 0.968 0.942 0.948 0.899
[0.080]*** [0.082]*** [0.081]*** [0.089]*** [0.090]*** [0.089]*** [0.090]*** [0.092]*** [0.086]*** [0.080]*** [0.102]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.789 0.758 0.834 0.806 0.924 1.016 0.801 0.94 0.642 0.752 0.371
[0.671] [0.708] [0.743] [0.737] [0.765] [0.747] [0.754] [0.731] [0.729] [0.658] [0.756]
Ownership [New Private] 0.05 0.096 0.121 0.049 0.143 0.229 0.002 0.18 0.011 0.041 -0.14
[0.446] [0.434] [0.439] [0.453] [0.456] [0.441] [0.457] [0.449] [0.434] [0.423] [0.445]
Ownership [Foreign] 2.416 2.542 2.456 2.563 2.719 2.653 2.684 2.764 2.446 2.45 2.101
[0.871]*** [0.872]*** [0.901]*** [0.853]*** [0.899]*** [0.902]*** [0.887]*** [0.913]*** [0.877]*** [0.821]*** [0.940]**
Log (1 + Export / Sales) -1.51 -1.673 -1.632 -1.557 -1.756 -1.662 -1.737 -1.694 -1.565 -1.557 -1.37
[0.776]* [0.805]** [0.820]** [0.805]* [0.840]** [0.835]** [0.852]** [0.835]** [0.813]* [0.761]** [0.880]
More than 3 Competitors 0.134 0.114 0.135 0.13 0.122 0.119 0.155 0.121 0.152 0.137 0.164
[0.076]* [0.076] [0.075]* [0.079]* [0.077] [0.076] [0.079]* [0.080] [0.074]** [0.074]* [0.078]**




Tax Rates  -0.204 -0.127
[0.062]*** [0.065]*
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  -0.113 0.061
[0.060]* [0.065]
Business Licencing & Permits  -0.137 -0.067
[0.063]** [0.066]
Macroeconomic Instability  -0.134 -0.11
[0.055]** [0.065]*
Corruption  -0.097 0.007
[0.053]* [0.071]
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  0.013 0.17
[0.064] [0.083]**
Anti-competitive Practices  -0.15 -0.049
[0.071]** [0.092]
Average of all Constraints -0.246
[0.092]***
Constant 1.238 1.306 1.379 1.113 1.097 1.057 1.133 0.711 1.321 1.477 2.028
[0.557]** [0.550]** [0.561]** [0.571]* [0.594]* [0.605]* [0.591]* [0.644] [0.529]** [0.541]*** [0.584]***
Observations 4992 5121 5091 4741 4968 5059 4843 4938 4981 5127 4305
J-Test 4.77 5.96 4.51 4.60 5.33 4.79 5.66 3.78 7.79 5.50 5.99
p-value 0.029 0.015 0.034 0.032 0.021 0.029 0.017 0.052 0.005 0.019 0.014
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 249.83 258.70 258.02 243.55 253.18 256.76 240.20 243.49 251.08 259.63 211.75
Log Assets 91.02 93.04 93.84 85.51 90.87 92.68 88.06 89.03 94.51 93.70 77.04
Ownership [Privatized] 40.12 40.21 40.07 37.59 39.46 40.30 39.19 39.43 39.62 40.60 35.43
Ownership [New Private] 102.85 106.78 107.99 98.06 104.78 107.93 102.33 102.91 105.91 108.86 85.77
Ownership [Foreign] 17.92 19.07 18.90 17.27 19.07 18.31 17.99 17.93 18.94 19.07 14.37
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 60.98 62.21 62.05 56.57 60.55 60.91 57.50 58.20 59.87 62.80 47.25
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 127.19 125.94 130.33 111.58 110.86 115.97 124.32 123.40 113.52 127.80 75.38
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Individual Constraints                                                                                                 
(IV Estimation without Year, Country or Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's 
age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in 
previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and 
CIS) dummies. The constraint variables at the firm level represent the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country,  2-
digit sector and firm size (small, medium, large). The average of all constraints is based on all 15 constraints in the BEEPS survey.    
123456789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.586 0.59 0.608 0.604 0.541 0.512 0.54 0.605 0.585 0.592 0.458
[0.190]*** [0.184]*** [0.177]*** [0.184]*** [0.192]*** [0.195]*** [0.201]*** [0.182]*** [0.183]*** [0.185]*** [0.221]**
Log Fixed Assets 0.369 0.367 0.349 0.361 0.422 0.462 0.397 0.341 0.368 0.365 0.511
[0.204]* [0.195]* [0.187]* [0.191]* [0.201]** [0.201]** [0.216]* [0.198]* [0.195]* [0.197]* [0.228]**
Ownership [Privatized] -0.237 -0.422 -0.411 -0.407 -0.379 -0.337 -0.414 -0.413 -0.446 -0.306 -0.327
[0.387] [0.426] [0.422] [0.440] [0.469] [0.486] [0.444] [0.406] [0.429] [0.375] [0.527]
Ownership [New Private] -0.489 -0.53 -0.518 -0.493 -0.496 -0.448 -0.597 -0.517 -0.543 -0.486 -0.478
[0.273]* [0.261]** [0.256]** [0.263]* [0.276]* [0.272]* [0.275]** [0.257]** [0.261]** [0.252]* [0.306]
Ownership [Foreign] 1.765 1.577 1.56 1.479 1.514 1.504 1.644 1.591 1.556 1.699 1.508
[0.516]*** [0.538]*** [0.526]*** [0.520]*** [0.571]*** [0.596]** [0.545]*** [0.502]*** [0.546]*** [0.492]*** [0.636]**
Log (1 + Export / Sales) -0.385 -0.25 -0.237 -0.146 -0.219 -0.116 -0.167 -0.103 -0.193 -0.339 -0.163
[0.528] [0.543] [0.534] [0.531] [0.568] [0.561] [0.565] [0.504] [0.552] [0.514] [0.633]
More than 3 Competitors 0.091 0.092 0.094 0.09 0.096 0.099 0.117 0.092 0.096 0.09 0.118
[0.051]* [0.051]* [0.050]* [0.050]* [0.052]* [0.052]* [0.055]** [0.049]* [0.051]* [0.051]* [0.059]**




Tax Rates  -0.019 0.002
[0.031] [0.043]
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  -0.002 0.069
[0.032] [0.047]
Business Licencing & Permits  -0.056 -0.072
[0.037] [0.046]
Macroeconomic Instability  -0.012 0.004
[0.037] [0.043]
Corruption  -0.062 -0.053
[0.035]* [0.050]
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  -0.053 0.015
[0.035] [0.059]
Anti-competitive Practices  -0.034 -0.054
[0.041] [0.053]
Average of all Constraints -0.055
[0.055]
Constant 1.47 1.585 1.601 1.482 1.559 1.373 1.742 1.68 1.603 1.616 1.481
[0.436]*** [0.388]*** [0.404]*** [0.392]*** [0.402]*** [0.402]*** [0.436]*** [0.436]*** [0.374]*** [0.402]*** [0.453]***
Observations 4992 5121 5091 4741 4968 5059 4843 4938 4981 5127 4305
J-Test 0.95 0.76 0.71 0.34 0.59 0.68 0.90 0.45 0.79 0.95 0.79
p-value 0.329 0.385 0.399 0.560 0.444 0.409 0.342 0.501 0.374 0.331 0.373
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 243.65 255.54 255.80 240.91 249.01 254.32 238.32 241.45 248.87 255.32 205.83
Log Assets 97.05 102.59 102.37 94.86 100.12 101.96 96.53 97.55 100.88 102.10 81.76
Ownership [Privatized] 41.15 41.18 40.78 38.44 40.65 40.75 40.11 40.67 40.55 41.03 34.88
Ownership [New Private] 102.02 108.34 107.96 97.56 105.65 108.08 102.84 103.78 105.44 108.19 83.88
Ownership [Foreign] 17.07 18.11 18.04 16.18 17.97 17.42 16.98 17.10 17.77 18.10 14.10
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 48.78 50.56 49.90 44.90 48.62 49.20 46.15 46.84 47.95 50.70 38.15
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 62.86 66.98 64.25 62.95 64.99 66.42 71.95 68.13 67.71 66.24 63.21
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Individual Constraints                                                                                                 
(IV Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's 
age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in 
previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and 
CIS) dummies. The constraint variables at the firm level represent the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country,  2-
digit sector and firm size (small, medium, large). The average of all constraints is based on all 15 constraints in the BEEPS survey.    
1234567
Log Employment 0.592 0.551 0.507 0.503 0.522 0.558 0.574
[0.178]*** [0.203]*** [0.224]** [0.204]** [0.215]** [0.194]*** [0.199]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.345 0.389 0.429 0.442 0.412 0.379 0.362
[0.194]* [0.220]* [0.241]* [0.217]** [0.232]* [0.208]* [0.218]*
Ownership [Privatized] -0.546 -0.345 -0.372 -0.407 -0.411 -0.415 -0.454
[0.430] [0.453] [0.464] [0.474] [0.469] [0.437] [0.472]
Ownership [New Private] -0.605 -0.55 -0.589 -0.572 -0.631 -0.584 -0.588
[0.267]** [0.276]** [0.281]** [0.288]** [0.289]** [0.270]** [0.285]**
Ownership [Foreign] 1.508 1.678 1.646 1.56 1.735 1.619 1.604
[0.502]*** [0.537]*** [0.567]*** [0.562]*** [0.590]*** [0.528]*** [0.538]***
Log (1 + Export / Sales) -0.007 -0.185 -0.216 -0.125 -0.294 -0.168 -0.145
[0.525] [0.564] [0.579] [0.576] [0.610] [0.557] [0.563]
More than 3 Competitors 0.111 0.114 0.111 0.117 0.13 0.115 0.112
[0.052]** [0.053]** [0.056]** [0.055]** [0.056]** [0.054]** [0.054]**
Corruption -0.044 -0.012 -0.168 -0.066 -0.165 -0.202 -0.176
[0.083] [0.113] [0.087]* [0.086] [0.108] [0.112]* [0.144]
Functioning of the Judiciary 0.085 0.15
[0.088] [0.115]
Uncertainty about Regulatory Policies 0.109 0.196
[0.084] [0.113]*
Labor Regulations -0.156 -0.182
[0.100] [0.111]*
Business Licensing & Permits -0.075 -0.06
[0.101] [0.117]
Tax Administration -0.08 -0.048
[0.081] [0.114]
Tax Rates -0.109 -0.143
[0.081] [0.115]
Corruption x Functioning of the Judiciary -0.019 -0.054
[0.034] [0.046]
Corruption x Uncertainty about Regulatory Policies -0.026 -0.061
[0.037] [0.048]
Corruption x Labor Regulation 0.061 0.074
[0.041] [0.046]
Corruption x Business Licensing & Permits 0.013 0.006
[0.039] [0.043]
Corruption x Tax Administration 0.04 0.014
[0.036] [0.048]
Corruption x Tax Rates 0.05 0.072
[0.036] [0.050]
Constant 1.689 1.436 1.991 1.767 1.968 2.06 1.929
[0.448]*** [0.504]*** [0.431]*** [0.427]*** [0.495]*** [0.474]*** [0.475]***
Observations 4705 4790 4788 4731 4778 4816 4487
J-Test 1.10 0.69 1.05 0.69 0.97 0.97 1.23
p-value 0.294 0.407 0.306 0.405 0.325 0.325 0.267
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 227.84 232.40 231.43 232.38 234.28 236.42 213.36
Log Assets 91.59 94.36 95.14 94.33 95.77 96.31 88.27
Ownership [Privatized] 37.70 39.02 39.50 39.73 38.94 39.41 35.45
Ownership [New Private] 97.83 99.19 100.33 100.13 100.52 101.79 90.25
Ownership [Foreign] 16.77 16.95 17.26 16.80 16.56 16.98 16.31
Log (1 + Exports / Sales) 44.12 45.02 44.96 44.59 45.28 45.33 40.93
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 72.53 71.60 76.01 70.35 73.38 69.64 73.11
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5: Revenue Efficiency - Interactions with Corruption                                                                   
(IV Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and size (small, medium and large) in brackets
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership 
Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in 
fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio 
and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies. The constraint variables 
at the firm level represent the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country,  2-digit sector 
and firm size (small, medium, large). The average of all constraints is based on all 15 constraints in the BEEPS survey.   
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Log Employment 0.597 0.595 0.600 0.599 0.599 0.597 0.595 0.594 0.593 0.597 0.601 0.569
[0.168]*** [0.163]*** [0.168]*** [0.165]*** [0.167]*** [0.166]*** [0.166]*** [0.164]*** [0.169]*** [0.168]*** [0.164]*** [0.166]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.373 0.378 0.372 0.373 0.373 0.376 0.378 0.379 0.383 0.376 0.371 0.411
[0.178]** [0.173]** [0.179]** [0.176]** [0.178]** [0.177]** [0.177]** [0.174]** [0.182]** [0.179]** [0.176]** [0.178]**
Ownership [Privatized] -0.263 -0.264 -0.268 -0.281 -0.264 -0.266 -0.291 -0.259 -0.292 -0.262 -0.274 -0.245
[0.377] [0.375] [0.375] [0.378] [0.376] [0.375] [0.382] [0.375] [0.374] [0.373] [0.372] [0.368]
Ownership [New Private] -0.441 -0.435 -0.439 -0.439 -0.437 -0.436 -0.436 -0.432 -0.433 -0.439 -0.441 -0.397
[0.255]* [0.255]* [0.255]* [0.257]* [0.256]* [0.255]* [0.255]* [0.255]* [0.255]* [0.252]* [0.254]* [0.249]
Ownership [Foreign] 1.543 1.527 1.535 1.516 1.542 1.533 1.501 1.528 1.504 1.525 1.526 1.514
[0.479]*** [0.480]*** [0.475]*** [0.486]*** [0.479]*** [0.477]*** [0.488]*** [0.477]*** [0.485]*** [0.478]*** [0.479]*** [0.489]***
Log (1 + Export / Sales) -0.155 -0.147 -0.149 -0.139 -0.154 -0.143 -0.133 -0.150 -0.143 -0.136 -0.142 -0.169
[0.480] [0.480] [0.477] [0.481] [0.481] [0.481] [0.482] [0.480] [0.480] [0.479] [0.478] [0.482]
More than 3 Competitors 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.071 0.069 0.068 0.070 0.069 0.071 0.066 0.069 0.071
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.045]
Trade Policy -0.061 -0.158
[0.063] [0.091]*
Fiscal Burden of Government -0.024 -0.050
[0.059] [0.048]
Government Intervention in the Economy -0.004 -0.064
[0.032] [0.050]
Monetary Policy 0.111 0.252
[0.084] [0.127]**
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment -0.050 0.129
[0.074] [0.117]
Banking and Finance -0.051 -0.124
[0.051] [0.070]*
Wages and Prices -0.102 -0.055
[0.066] [0.080]




Informal Market 0.142 0.238
[0.095] [0.111]**
Index of Economic Freedom 0.042
[0.224]
Constant 1.578 1.485 1.416 0.885 1.558 1.587 1.707 1.753 -0.131 0.813 1.241 -0.636
[0.368]*** [0.537]*** [0.427]*** [0.658] [0.458]*** [0.450]*** [0.431]*** [0.621]*** [1.222] [0.675] [1.096] [2.345]
Observations 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430
J-Test 1.11 1.16 1.15 1.02 1.09 1.12 1.04 1.17 1.11 1.18 1.16 0.95
p-value 0.293 0.281 0.284 0.311 0.296 0.289 0.308 0.278 0.293 0.277 0.281 0.329
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 290.13 291.60 290.68 290.90 291.23 291.27 290.36 292.09 291.45 290.76 290.38 288.48
Log Assets 118.74 118.64 117.93 120.18 118.34 118.54 118.44 119.26 119.12 118.22 117.87 121.86
Ownership [Privatized] 42.38 42.41 42.41 42.54 42.65 42.43 41.84 42.43 42.50 42.32 42.21 42.13
Ownership [New Private] 112.79 113.09 112.79 113.45 113.09 113.15 112.47 113.18 113.14 112.67 112.48 111.85
Ownership [Foreign] 19.02 19.00 19.12 19.04 19.04 19.10 19.03 19.02 19.02 19.03 19.10 19.17
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 58.11 58.14 58.05 58.08 58.16 58.30 58.10 58.16 58.19 58.08 58.02 57.84
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 72.67 72.35 73.04 72.73 73.16 74.11 72.86 72.28 72.84 72.49 73.64 75.26
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Heritage Foundation Indices (IV Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note:All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's age, skill ratio 
(college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in 
previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies. The Heritage Foundation Indices 
measure, on the country level, institutional factors determining economic freedom on a scale from 1 to 5. The index of economic freedom is the simple average of the 10 
individual indices.  
123 456789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.587 0.593 0.572 0.582 0.581 0.590 0.593 0.719 0.591 0.590 0.590 0.591 0.691
[0.178]*** [0.175]*** [0.184]*** [0.180]*** [0.181]*** [0.175]*** [0.174]*** [0.155]*** [0.177]*** [0.177]*** [0.178]*** [0.177]*** [0.155]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.396 0.391 0.411 0.401 0.402 0.393 0.389 0.252 0.391 0.393 0.392 0.391 0.285
[0.192]** [0.190]** [0.199]** [0.195]** [0.196]** [0.188]** [0.188]** [0.162] [0.191]** [0.191]** [0.192]** [0.191]** [0.162]*
Ownership [Privatized] -0.329 -0.354 -0.327 -0.325 -0.326 -0.357 -0.344 -0.554 -0.346 -0.354 -0.347 -0.351 -0.524
[0.395] [0.400] [0.404] [0.411] [0.409] [0.409] [0.406] [0.372] [0.407] [0.407] [0.406] [0.407] [0.382]
Ownership [New Private] -0.433 -0.438 -0.437 -0.428 -0.427 -0.439 -0.439 -0.493 -0.439 -0.441 -0.440 -0.441 -0.462
[0.269] [0.269] [0.271] [0.273] [0.272] [0.270] [0.271] [0.257]* [0.271] [0.270] [0.271] [0.271] [0.255]*
Ownership [Foreign] 1.475 1.450 1.486 1.468 1.455 1.447 1.471 1.219 1.449 1.450 1.460 1.455 1.186
[0.512]*** [0.516]*** [0.523]*** [0.521]*** [0.519]*** [0.521]*** [0.516]*** [0.450]*** [0.516]*** [0.521]*** [0.518]*** [0.521]*** [0.452]***
Log (1 + Export / Sales) -0.066 -0.060 -0.082 -0.059 -0.051 -0.040 -0.059 0.254 -0.046 -0.045 -0.053 -0.050 0.256
[0.523] [0.525] [0.533] [0.529] [0.528] [0.528] [0.526] [0.449] [0.525] [0.529] [0.527] [0.528] [0.445]
More than 3 Competitors 0.079 0.077 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.066 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.063
[0.046]* [0.046]* [0.047]* [0.046]* [0.046]* [0.046]* [0.046]* [0.043] [0.046]* [0.046]* [0.046]* [0.046]* [0.043]
Registering a Business [Number of Procedures] -0.011 -0.011
[0.022] [0.022]
Registering a Business [Time in Days] -0.006 -0.004
[0.003]* [0.004]
Registering a Business [Cost in % GNI] -0.013 -0.016
[0.005]*** [0.006]***
Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment] 0.007 0.011
[0.005] [0.008]
Employing Workers [Firing] 0.007 0.014
[0.004]* [0.009]
Employing Workers [Firing Cost in Weeks of Wages] -0.005 -0.022
[0.006] [0.006]***
Enforcing a Contract [Number of Procedures] 0.023 0.049
[0.036] [0.047]
Enforcing a Contract [Time in Days] -0.001 -0.002
[0.001]* [0.001]**
Enforcing a Contract [Cost in % of Debt] 0.020 -0.029
[0.017] [0.043]
Closing a Business [Time in Years] -0.055 0.305
[0.182] [0.255]
Closing a Business [Cost in % of Estate] -0.049 0.011
[0.008]*** [0.030]
Closing a Business [100 - (Recovery Rate in Cents to de Dollar)] -0.002 -0.028
[0.009] [0.014]*
Constant 1.461 1.568 1.580 0.899 0.724 1.382 0.676 1.776 1.001 1.481 3.384 1.554 1.467
[0.567]*** [0.388]*** [0.401]*** [0.585] [0.650] [0.452]*** [1.252] [0.340]*** [0.574]* [0.643]** [0.667]*** [0.928]* [2.448]
Observations 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 4692 5050 5050 5050 5050 4692
J-Test 1.97 1.95 1.91 1.90 1.91 1.89 1.94 5.68 1.97 1.91 1.94 1.94 5.97
p-value 0.161 0.162 0.167 0.168 0.167 0.170 0.163 0.017 0.161 0.167 0.164 0.163 0.015
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 268.56 268.55 268.65 268.85 268.74 268.85 268.82 248.18 268.79 268.79 268.93 268.93 246.51
Log Assets 107.47 107.70 108.01 108.06 108.40 108.01 107.99 100.18 108.03 107.86 107.99 107.96 100.26
Ownership [Privatized] 37.86 37.90 37.93 37.99 37.97 37.83 37.95 37.18 37.90 38.00 37.95 37.94 36.98
Ownership [New Private] 102.54 102.88 102.84 102.93 102.97 102.96 102.97 95.90 102.97 103.13 102.99 102.97 95.65
Ownership [Foreign] 17.56 17.62 17.61 17.62 17.64 17.61 17.63 17.14 17.64 17.62 17.62 17.63 17.25
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 54.16 54.21 54.17 54.18 54.12 54.19 54.19 51.24 54.16 54.15 54.21 54.37 51.17
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 62.16 62.15 63.72 62.61 62.38 62.57 62.56 56.44 61.97 62.41 62.54 62.57 56.01
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size [small, medium and large] in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Doing Business Indicators (IV Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's age, skill ratio [college/high school], skill ratio - 
age interaction, location [city], % change in fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio - age 
interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies.  The Doing Business Indicators measure elements of the business climate on a country level a score indicates that the 
business climate is worse. All Indicators are measured defined, except for "Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment]" and "Employing Workers [Firing]", which are measured on a scale from 0 to 
100 (100 is the most rigid). The Doing Business Indicators report "Closing a Business [Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar]. This was recoded to "Closing a Business [100 - Recovery Rate in Cents to 
the Dollar]" such that, consistent with the other indicators, a higher score is associated with a worse business climate.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Log Employment Growth 0.238 0.242 0.241 0.244 0.243 0.245 0.242 0.246 0.246 0.245 0.246 0.245 0.238 0.244 0.238
[0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.032]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]*** [0.033]***
Log Fixed Assets Growth 0.264 0.269 0.258 0.263 0.268 0.265 0.267 0.263 0.262 0.264 0.263 0.260 0.274 0.263 0.279
[0.092]*** [0.090]*** [0.094]*** [0.092]*** [0.093]*** [0.094]*** [0.093]*** [0.092]*** [0.092]*** [0.092]*** [0.092]*** [0.092]*** [0.097]*** [0.093]*** [0.099]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.035 0.051 0.062 0.049 0.057 0.047 0.055 0.057 0.057 0.049 0.051 0.051 0.051
[0.062] [0.067] [0.068] [0.066] [0.067] [0.067] [0.068] [0.067] [0.068] [0.068] [0.067] [0.067] [0.070]
Ownership [New Private] -0.032 -0.009 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.015 -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 -0.013
[0.065] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070] [0.069] [0.069] [0.071] [0.069] [0.070] [0.069] [0.070] [0.069] [0.073]
Ownership [Foreign] 0.021 0.035 0.043 0.038 0.041 0.023 0.036 0.039 0.042 0.026 0.050 0.035 0.038
[0.070] [0.075] [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [0.077] [0.078] [0.076] [0.078] [0.076] [0.076] [0.075] [0.080]
Log (1 + Export / Sales) 0.137 0.111 0.111 0.110 0.107 0.102 0.116 0.114 0.117 0.146 0.106 0.111 0.126
[0.076]* [0.078] [0.079] [0.077] [0.078] [0.081] [0.079] [0.078] [0.081] [0.075]* [0.078] [0.078] [0.078]
More than 3 Competitors -0.047 -0.049 -0.048 -0.050 -0.052 -0.050 -0.049 -0.050 -0.051 -0.054 -0.043 -0.049 -0.055
[0.034] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037]
Cost of Financing  -0.033 -0.032
[0.024] [0.028]
Infrastructure  -0.033 -0.022
[0.040] [0.049]
Tax Rates  -0.024 -0.033
[0.023] [0.026]
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  0.028 0.029
[0.024] [0.025]
Business Licencing & Permits  0.015 0.018
[0.025] [0.025]
Macroeconomic Instability  -0.001 0.001
[0.023] [0.029]
Corruption  -0.007 0.000
[0.023] [0.027]
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  0.004 0.023
[0.030] [0.040]
Anti-competitive Practices  -0.009 -0.013
[0.027] [0.029]
Average of all Constraints -0.002
[0.042]
Constant 2.385 2.351 2.420 2.380 2.440 2.418 2.441 2.317 2.342 2.372 2.386 2.382 2.370 2.385 2.432
[0.378]*** [0.371]*** [0.386]*** [0.379]*** [0.380]*** [0.371]*** [0.373]*** [0.379]*** [0.371]*** [0.389]*** [0.373]*** [0.371]*** [0.396]*** [0.366]*** [0.397]***
Observations 683 683 662 662 658 662 660 657 657 660 655 655 659 662 648
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8: Impact of 2002 Constraints on 2002 - 2005 rate of growth in revenues (OLS Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The constraint variables at the firm level represent the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country,  2-digit sector and firm size (small, medium and large). The 
average of all constraints is based on all 15 constraints in the BEEPS survey. 
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets 
12345678
Log Employment 0.221 0.217 0.22 0.25 0.348 0.327 0.384 0.361
[0.179] [0.181] [0.176] [0.171] [0.225] [0.257] [0.225]* [0.248]
Log Assets 0.87 0.857 0.873 0.814 0.629 0.654 0.594 0.621
[0.192]*** [0.196]*** [0.189]*** [0.186]*** [0.231]*** [0.266]** [0.234]** [0.259]**
Log Exports / Sales 0.528 0.872 -0.767 -0.49
[0.388] [0.407]** [0.572] [0.596]
More than 3 Competitors 0.01 0.037 0.054 0.051
[0.053] [0.052] [0.051] [0.055]
Ownership [Privatized] -0.455 -0.062 -0.139 0.073
[0.474] [0.467] [0.424] [0.439]
Ownership [New Private] -0.59 -0.511 -0.446 -0.412
[0.323]* [0.319] [0.294] [0.298]
Ownership [Foreign] 1.061 1.785 1.382 1.794
[0.436]** [0.664]*** [0.414]*** [0.626]***
Constant -0.054 -0.044 -0.071 -0.036 0.789 0.633 0.594 0.507
[0.236] [0.239] [0.258] [0.251] [0.466]* [0.480] [0.441] [0.463]
Observations 5308 5261 5117 5070 5308 5261 5117 5070
J-Test 14.04 13.67 14.54 12.39 5.97 3.15 3.42 2.38
p-value 0.015 0.008 0.013 0.015 0.201 0.076 0.181 0.123
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 293.91 291.24 281.35 278.59 293.91 291.24 281.35 278.59
Log Assets 124.15 123.43 115.68 114.94 124.15 123.43 115.68 114.94
Log Exports / Sales 52.71 53.13 52.71 53.13
Ownership [Privatized] 44.34 44.28 43.11 43.12
Ownership [New Private] 118.33 118.80 112.89 113.31
Ownership [Foreign] 16.99 16.45 16.34 15.73
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 47.62 49.61 51.06 56.43 63.53 65.18 69.67 66.87
p - v a l u e 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A1: Value Added Efficiency - Baseline Regressions                                                               
(IV Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership 
Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in 
fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill 
ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies 



































Average of all 
15 Constraints
More than 3 Competitors 1.0000
Access to Financing  0.0533* 1.0000
Cost of Financing  0.0664* 0.7459* 1.0000
Infrastructure  0.0153 0.2466* 0.2670* 1.0000
Tax Rates  0.0543* 0.4592* 0.5703* 0.3466* 1.0000
Tax Administration  0.0157 0.3662* 0.4160* 0.3926* 0.6839* 1.0000
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  0.0109 0.3181* 0.3807* 0.4132* 0.4544* 0.5327* 1.0000
Business Licencing & Permits  0.0335* 0.3105* 0.3103* 0.4258* 0.3569* 0.4385* 0.5244* 1.0000
Labour Regulations  0.0762* 0.3134* 0.3783* 0.2819* 0.4597* 0.3338* 0.3482* 0.3118* 1.0000
Uncertainty about Regulatory Policies  0.0459* 0.4252* 0.5005* 0.2570* 0.5065* 0.3797* 0.3727* 0.3456* 0.3981* 1.0000
Macro-economic Instability  0.0310* 0.4640* 0.5316* 0.3151* 0.5327* 0.4423* 0.4414* 0.3755* 0.3650* 0.7836* 1.0000
Functioning of the Judiciary  0.0519* 0.3201* 0.4221* 0.3837* 0.3676* 0.2942* 0.3813* 0.3916* 0.4442* 0.5417* 0.5373* 1.0000
Corruption  0.0567* 0.3190* 0.4058* 0.4213* 0.4059* 0.4428* 0.4745* 0.4857* 0.2703* 0.4576* 0.4922* 0.6410* 1.0000
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  0.0435* 0.2477* 0.3484* 0.3596* 0.3910* 0.3746* 0.3139* 0.3127* 0.3323* 0.5052* 0.4662* 0.5155* 0.5908* 1.0000
Organised Crime & Mafia  0.0423* 0.2838* 0.3472* 0.3648* 0.2798* 0.3069* 0.4084* 0.3702* 0.2919* 0.4662* 0.4570* 0.5448* 0.6461* 0.7486* 1.0000
Anti-competitive Practices  0.1011* 0.3065* 0.3996* 0.2959* 0.4155* 0.2458* 0.3200* 0.2699* 0.4069* 0.4657* 0.4446* 0.5451* 0.4986* 0.4394* 0.4458* 1.0000
Average of all 15 Constraints 0.0691* 0.6135* 0.7035* 0.5391* 0.7289* 0.6674* 0.6555* 0.6047* 0.5839* 0.7409* 0.7630* 0.7160* 0.7400* 0.6764* 0.6727* 0.6374* 1.0000
Table A2. Pairwise Correlation of Constraints 



















More than 3 Competitors 0.011 -0.021 0.068 -0.061 -0.003 -0.036 -0.004 0.037 0.14
[0.021] [0.014] [0.021]*** [0.020]*** [0.019] [0.021]* [0.019] [0.019]* [0.020]***
Cost of Financing  0.006 -0.013 0.308 0.02 0.049 0.181 0.045 0.017 0.121
[0.011] [0.017] [0.028]*** [0.026] [0.024]** [0.025]*** [0.024]* [0.024] [0.026]***
Infrastructure -0.027 -0.031 0.153 0.213 0.235 -0.052 0.152 0.194 0.063
[0.018] [0.041] [0.041]*** [0.041]*** [0.037]*** [0.036] [0.039]*** [0.045]*** [0.042]
Tax Rates  0.038 0.325 0.067 0.138 0.049 0.18 -0.031 0.083 0.089
[0.012]*** [0.029]*** [0.019]*** [0.028]*** [0.023]** [0.028]*** [0.025] [0.025]*** [0.029]***
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  -0.035 0.022 0.095 0.14 0.289 0.152 0.101 -0.052 0.056
[0.011]*** [0.028] [0.019]*** [0.028]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]*** [0.025]** [0.027]**
Business Licencing & Permits  -0.002 0.061 0.123 0.059 0.338 0.062 0.154 0.016 -0.035
[0.012] [0.030]** [0.019]*** [0.028]** [0.029]*** [0.030]** [0.028]*** [0.026] [0.030]
Macroeconomic Instability  -0.021 0.199 -0.024 0.187 0.157 0.054 0.161 0.099 0.05
[0.012]* [0.028]*** [0.017] [0.029]*** [0.025]*** [0.026]** [0.026]*** [0.023]*** [0.027]*
Corruption -0.002 0.055 0.078 -0.036 0.115 0.15 0.179 0.339 0.26
[0.012] [0.030]* [0.020]*** [0.029] [0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.026]*** [0.030]***
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  0.025 0.023 0.107 0.103 -0.064 0.017 0.118 0.365 0.081
[0.013]* [0.031] [0.024]*** [0.033]*** [0.030]** [0.027] [0.027]*** [0.027]*** [0.033]**
Anti-competitive Practices  0.077 0.126 0.027 0.088 0.054 -0.029 0.047 0.222 0.064
[0.011]*** [0.027]*** [0.018] [0.029]*** [0.026]** [0.025] [0.025]* [0.026]*** [0.026]**
Constant 0.666 0.502 0.591 0.527 -0.081 0.367 0.672 -0.199 0.183 0.664
[0.038]*** [0.081]*** [0.054]*** [0.080]*** [0.071] [0.067]*** [0.074]*** [0.063]*** [0.091]** [0.077]***
Observations 5602 5602 5602 5602 5602 5602 5602 5602 5602 5602
R-squared without fixed effects 0.02 0.35 0.27 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.39 0.48 0.36 0.29
R-squared with country + year+ sector fixed effects 0.06 0.47 0.41 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.57 0.54 0.41
R-squared with country + year+ sector fixed effects 
and other regressors 0.33 0.63 0.44 0.58 0.70 0.67 0.60 0.71 0.73 0.72
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Regression coefficients are from a regression of the dependent variable in each column on the other constraints and the number of competitors; the R-squared values are from the reported regression as well as 
from regressions with the same regressors plus country, year and sector fixed effects and (in the last row) the other regressors in the TFP models; the other regressors are the fitted values (in a first stage) of Log 
Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Exports/Sales), Ownership variables; instruments omitted in the second stage are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in 
fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) 
dummies
Table A3. Partial correlation among constraints 
123456789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.636 0.64 0.637 0.647 0.649 0.649 0.639 0.638 0.645 0.64 0.667
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.384 0.38 0.384 0.376 0.376 0.375 0.38 0.377 0.371 0.381 0.35
[0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.043 0.071 0.047 0.07 0.049 0.03 0.078 0.033 0.025 0.054 0.008
[0.061] [0.061] [0.061] [0.064] [0.062] [0.061] [0.063] [0.061] [0.063] [0.061] [0.064]
Ownership [New Private] 0.305 0.33 0.312 0.336 0.332 0.308 0.343 0.295 0.27 0.327 0.289
[0.064]*** [0.063]*** [0.063]*** [0.065]*** [0.062]*** [0.063]*** [0.066]*** [0.064]*** [0.064]*** [0.063]*** [0.063]***
Ownership [Foreign] 0.407 0.434 0.423 0.445 0.433 0.415 0.46 0.423 0.392 0.43 0.391
[0.075]*** [0.075]*** [0.074]*** [0.075]*** [0.074]*** [0.074]*** [0.077]*** [0.075]*** [0.076]*** [0.075]*** [0.075]***
Log Exports / Sales 0.312 0.3 0.304 0.343 0.315 0.339 0.304 0.296 0.337 0.311 0.336
[0.115]*** [0.112]*** [0.112]*** [0.115]*** [0.110]*** [0.112]*** [0.115]*** [0.116]** [0.116]*** [0.112]*** [0.110]***
More than 3 Competitors 0.199 0.184 0.204 0.193 0.189 0.2 0.203 0.21 0.191 0.202 0.173
[0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.044]*** [0.043]*** [0.041]*** [0.043]*** [0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.044]***




Tax Rates  -0.104 0.006
[0.042]** [0.042]
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  -0.152 0.032
[0.041]*** [0.040]
Business Licencing & Permits  -0.273 -0.185
[0.039]*** [0.041]***
Macroeconomic Instability  -0.246 -0.248
[0.036]*** [0.041]***
Corruption  -0.169 -0.096
[0.036]*** [0.049]**
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  -0.154 0
[0.042]*** [0.054]
Anti-competitive Practices  0.122 0.33
[0.039]*** [0.042]***
Average of all Constraints -0.278
[0.061]***
Constant 1.922 2.228 1.995 2 2.24 2.367 2.049 2.026 1.492 2.309 2.526
[0.134]*** [0.142]*** [0.156]*** [0.131]*** [0.131]*** [0.143]*** [0.129]*** [0.128]*** [0.133]*** [0.170]*** [0.178]***
Observations 4992 5121 5091 4741 4968 5059 4843 4938 4981 5127 4305
0.72 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.74
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TableA4: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Individual Constraints                                                                                               
(OLS Estimation without Year, Country or Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The constraint variables at the firm level represent the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country,  2-digit 
sector and firm size (small, medium and large). The average of all constraints is based on all 15 constraints in the BEEPS survey 
123456789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.903 0.904 0.904 0.901 0.902 0.903 0.9 0.9 0.906 0.904 0.896
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.014]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.157 0.155 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.155 0.158 0.155 0.153 0.155 0.154
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.042 0.038 0.037 0.044 0.038 0.038 0.056 0.039 0.03 0.04 0.039
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.045] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.043] [0.046]
Ownership [New Private] 0.137 0.133 0.13 0.133 0.135 0.133 0.149 0.135 0.129 0.135 0.134
[0.041]*** [0.042]*** [0.041]*** [0.044]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.043]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.043]***
Ownership [Foreign] 0.308 0.307 0.316 0.302 0.304 0.307 0.316 0.316 0.3 0.31 0.314
[0.055]*** [0.055]*** [0.054]*** [0.057]*** [0.057]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** [0.056]*** [0.055]*** [0.056]***
Log Export / Sales 0.173 0.181 0.174 0.18 0.18 0.181 0.184 0.168 0.196 0.178 0.175
[0.080]** [0.079]** [0.079]** [0.080]** [0.080]** [0.079]** [0.081]** [0.080]** [0.079]** [0.079]** [0.082]**
More than 3 competitors -0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001
[0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.032]




Tax Rates  -0.022 -0.031
[0.022] [0.027]
Customs / Foreign Trade Regulations  0.024 0.056
[0.021] [0.027]**
Business Licencing & Permits  -0.021 -0.044
[0.022] [0.029]
Macroeconomic Instability  0.017 0.028
[0.023] [0.028]
Corruption  -0.008 -0.009
[0.022] [0.030]
Street Crime, Theft & Disorder  -0.053 -0.047
[0.025]** [0.032]
Anti-competitive Practices  0.017 0.015
[0.021] [0.025]
Average of all Constraints -0.025
[0.037]
Constant 1.037 1.041 1.113 1 1.072 0.991 1.047 1.154 0.987 1.089 1.099
[0.112]*** [0.104]*** [0.108]*** [0.102]*** [0.102]*** [0.113]*** [0.105]*** [0.103]*** [0.100]*** [0.127]*** [0.136]***
Observations 4992 5121 5091 4741 4968 5059 4843 4938 4981 5127 4305
0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and size (small medium large) in brackets
Table A5: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Individual Constraints                                                                                               
(OLS Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The constraint variables at the firm level represent the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country,  2-digit sector 
and firm size (small, medium and large). The average of all constraints is based on all 15 constraints in the BEEPS survey. 
1234 56789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.649 0.65 0.684 0.744 0.683 0.74 0.687 0.694 0.727 0.741 0.763 0.829
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.016]*** [0.017]*** [0.015]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.377 0.37 0.332 0.3 0.352 0.298 0.343 0.338 0.313 0.283 0.279 0.205
[0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.010]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.102 0.058 0.086 0.075 0.123 0.059 0.054 0.112 0.119 0.107 0.093 0.062
[0.057]* [0.055] [0.053] [0.052] [0.056]** [0.052] [0.054] [0.054]** [0.052]** [0.052]** [0.051]* [0.047]
Ownership [New Private] 0.327 0.3 0.264 0.312 0.335 0.278 0.291 0.313 0.302 0.295 0.292 0.244
[0.061]*** [0.059]*** [0.055]*** [0.057]*** [0.060]*** [0.056]*** [0.057]*** [0.057]*** [0.054]*** [0.053]*** [0.055]*** [0.047]***
Ownership [Foreign] 0.42 0.393 0.4 0.436 0.421 0.417 0.396 0.41 0.426 0.402 0.415 0.404
[0.068]*** [0.067]*** [0.063]*** [0.062]*** [0.066]*** [0.062]*** [0.065]*** [0.065]*** [0.063]*** [0.062]*** [0.061]*** [0.057]***
Log Exports / Sales 0.236 0.281 0.289 0.244 0.172 0.179 0.216 0.137 0.041 0.09 0.09 0.119
[0.106]** [0.104]*** [0.102]*** [0.098]** [0.106] [0.107]* [0.097]** [0.099] [0.092] [0.092] [0.098] [0.083]
More than 3 Competitors 0.161 0.163 0.128 0.118 0.138 0.095 0.144 0.151 0.134 0.105 0.09 0.074
[0.039]*** [0.039]*** [0.038]*** [0.037]*** [0.038]*** [0.036]*** [0.037]*** [0.037]*** [0.036]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]** [0.033]**
Trade Policy -0.114 0.206
[0.029]*** [0.029]***
Fiscal Burden of Government -0.262 -0.107
[0.052]*** [0.035]***
Government Intervention in the Economy -0.321 -0.095
[0.033]*** [0.026]***
Monetary Policy -0.274 -0.231
[0.020]*** [0.024]***
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment -0.272 0.092
[0.029]*** [0.044]**
Banking and Finance -0.344 -0.009
[0.039]*** [0.043]
Wages and Prices -0.39 0.062
[0.028]*** [0.048]




Informal Market -0.587 -0.477
[0.032]*** [0.040]***
Index of Economic Freedom -0.691
[0.038]***
Constant 2.054 2.607 2.78 2.68 2.507 2.818 2.934 2.909 3.522 4.127 4.059 4.935
[0.121]*** [0.182]*** [0.123]*** [0.106]*** [0.117]*** [0.140]*** [0.121]*** [0.135]*** [0.140]*** [0.160]*** [0.148]*** [0.163]***
Observations 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430
0.74 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.81
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TableA6: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Heritage Foundation Indices (OLS Estimation without Year, Country or Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The Heritage Foundation Indices measure, on the country level, institutional factors determining economic freedom on a scale from 1 to 5. The index of economic freedom is 
the simple average of the 10 individual indices. 
1234 56789 1 0 1 1
Log Employment 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.905 0.904 0.905 0.904 0.905 0.904 0.904 0.905 0.900
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.158 0.157 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.157 0.158 0.156 0.160 0.159 0.156 0.162
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.036 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.038
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
Ownership [New Private] 0.134 0.131 0.134 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.133 0.134 0.136 0.134 0.133 0.136
[0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]***
Ownership [Foreign] 0.322 0.320 0.321 0.322 0.323 0.321 0.321 0.323 0.323 0.322 0.320 0.322
[0.051]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** [0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]*** [0.050]***
Log Exports / Sales 0.097 0.099 0.097 0.098 0.095 0.095 0.097 0.096 0.096 0.096 0.098 0.086
[0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.072]
More than 3 Competitors -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.014 -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015
[0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
Trade Policy -0.012 -0.086
[0.040] [0.056]
Fiscal Burden of Government -0.056 -0.041
[0.037] [0.040]
Government Intervention in the Economy -0.026 -0.045
[0.026] [0.034]
Monetary Policy -0.008 0.071
[0.035] [0.040]*
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment -0.059 0.023
[0.060] [0.069]
Banking and Finance -0.093 -0.109
[0.036]** [0.043]**
Wages and Prices -0.069 -0.047
[0.050] [0.059]




Informal Market 0.035 0.083
[0.042] [0.046]*
Index of Economic Freedom -0.228
[0.109]**
Constant 1.084 1.277 1.167 1.086 1.241 1.408 1.262 1.812 0.453 0.905 1.928 1.856
[0.139]*** [0.172]*** [0.142]*** [0.179]*** [0.216]*** [0.167]*** [0.184]*** [0.258]*** [0.336] [0.195]*** [0.428]*** [0.671]***
Observations 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430 5430
0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TableA7: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Heritage Foundation Indices (OLS Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The Heritage Foundation Indices measure, on the country level, institutional factors determining economic freedom on a scale from 1 to 5. The index of economic freedom 
is the simple average of the 10 individual indices. 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Log Employment 0.681 0.656 0.656 0.655 0.659 0.68 0.67 0.738 0.671 0.656 0.659 0.71 0.867
[0.017]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.019]*** [0.017]*** [0.018]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.015]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.337 0.365 0.365 0.369 0.36 0.349 0.355 0.316 0.346 0.365 0.366 0.327 0.199
[0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.014]*** [0.011]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.012]*** [0.011]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.033 0.1 0.098 0.118 0.086 0.126 0.111 0.137 0.099 0.1 0.073 0.068 0.136
[0.055] [0.059]* [0.058]* [0.059]** [0.058] [0.058]** [0.059]* [0.057]** [0.058]* [0.058]* [0.057] [0.054] [0.051]***
Ownership [New Private] 0.261 0.307 0.311 0.326 0.298 0.338 0.33 0.336 0.296 0.313 0.317 0.322 0.314
[0.058]*** [0.062]*** [0.062]*** [0.062]*** [0.061]*** [0.061]*** [0.064]*** [0.061]*** [0.061]*** [0.063]*** [0.062]*** [0.060]*** [0.052]***
Ownership [Foreign] 0.355 0.4 0.406 0.416 0.39 0.404 0.401 0.472 0.4 0.403 0.4 0.42 0.459
[0.067]*** [0.071]*** [0.070]*** [0.070]*** [0.070]*** [0.070]*** [0.070]*** [0.071]*** [0.070]*** [0.071]*** [0.069]*** [0.066]*** [0.062]***
Log Exports / Sales 0.337 0.332 0.332 0.288 0.324 0.224 0.267 0.06 0.343 0.313 0.293 0.168 -0.122
[0.103]*** [0.105]*** [0.105]*** [0.103]*** [0.106]*** [0.102]** [0.107]** [0.098] [0.105]*** [0.106]*** [0.106]*** [0.106] [0.087]
More than 3 Competitors 0.155 0.148 0.154 0.138 0.153 0.15 0.152 0.121 0.124 0.144 0.157 0.122 0.06
[0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.038]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]*** [0.041]*** [0.039]*** [0.035]*
Registering a Business [Number of Procedures] -0.085 -0.089
[0.008]*** [0.012]***
Registering a Business [Time in Days] -0.001 0.002
[0.002] [0.002]
Registering a Business [Cost in % GNI] -0.008 -0.008
[0.002]*** [0.002]***
Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment] 0.007 0.016
[0.002]*** [0.003]***
Employing Workers [Firing] -0.004 -0.008
[0.001]*** [0.002]***
Employing Workers [Firing Cost in Weeks of Wages] 0.013 0.009
[0.002]*** [0.002]***
Enforcing a Contract [Number of Procedures] -0.014 -0.018
[0.004]*** [0.003]***
Enforcing a Contract [Time in Days] 0.001 0.002
[0.000]*** [0.000]***
Enforcing a Contract [Cost in % of Debt] -0.044 -0.015
[0.005]*** [0.005]***
Closing a Business [Time in Years] -0.02 0.037
[0.017] [0.018]**
Closing a Business [Cost in % of Estate] -0.011 0.021
[0.003]*** [0.003]***
Closing a Business [100 - Recovery Rate in Cents to de Dollar] -0.025 -0.016
[0.003]*** [0.003]***
Constant 2.69 1.851 1.924 1.482 1.973 1.48 2.221 1.28 2.452 1.863 1.958 3.594 3.035
[0.120]*** [0.108]*** [0.097]*** [0.120]*** [0.103]*** [0.099]*** [0.146]*** [0.096]*** [0.122]*** [0.114]*** [0.102]*** [0.220]*** [0.224]***
Observations 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 4692 5050 5050 5050 5050 4692
0.76 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.82
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TableA8: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Doing Business Indicators (OLS Estimation without Year, Country or Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The Doing Business Indicators measure elements of the business climate on a country level a score indicates that the business climate is worse; all Indicators are measured defined, except for 
"Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment]" and "Employing Workers [Firing]", which are measured on a scale from 0 to 100 (100 is the most rigid); the Doing Business Indicators report "Closing a 
Business [Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar]; this was recoded to "Closing a Business [100 - Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar]" such that, consistent with the other indicators, a higher score is 
associated with a worse business climate. 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3
Log Employment 0.904 0.904 0.904 0.905 0.904 0.905 0.905 0.909 0.905 0.905 0.905 0.905 0.905
[0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]*** [0.013]***
Log Fixed Assets 0.156 0.158 0.158 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.155 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.16
[0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.010]***
Ownership [Privatized] 0.06 0.063 0.065 0.067 0.064 0.059 0.063 0.052 0.064 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.056
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.043] [0.044] [0.043] [0.046] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.046]
Ownership [New Private] 0.151 0.152 0.156 0.156 0.153 0.15 0.152 0.142 0.153 0.153 0.152 0.152 0.147
[0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.045]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.042]*** [0.045]***
Ownership [Foreign] 0.349 0.35 0.355 0.355 0.353 0.35 0.351 0.341 0.353 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.348
[0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.056]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.053]*** [0.056]***
Log Exports / Sales 0.137 0.135 0.133 0.131 0.131 0.135 0.134 0.119 0.133 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.111
[0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.082] [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.077]* [0.081]
More than 3 Competitors -0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031]
Registering a Business [Number of Procedures] -0.03 -0.018
[0.018]* [0.021]
Registering a Business [Time in Days] -0.004 -0.002
[0.002]** [0.003]
Registering a Business [Cost in % GNI] -0.01 -0.011
[0.003]*** [0.005]**
Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment] 0.007 0.01
[0.003]** [0.007]
Employing Workers [Firing] 0.003 0.007
[0.002] [0.006]
Employing Workers [Firing Cost in Weeks of Wages] -0.004 -0.013
[0.004] [0.005]***
Enforcing a Contract [Number of Procedures] 0.006 0.044
[0.023] [0.030]
Enforcing a Contract [Time in Days] -0.001 -0.002
[0.000]*** [0.001]***
Enforcing a Contract [Cost in % of Debt] 0.014 -0.009
[0.013] [0.035]
Closing a Business [Time in Years] -0.111 0.15
[0.123] [0.149]
Closing a Business [Cost in % of Estate] 0.005 0.024
[0.006] [0.026]
Closing a Business [100 - Recovery Rate in Cents to de Dollar] 0 -0.016
[0.007] [0.012]
Constant 1.409 1.174 1.221 0.628 0.729 1.053 0.848 1.22 0.771 1.324 0.809 1.039 -0.055
[0.255]*** [0.112]*** [0.103]*** [0.202]*** [0.216]*** [0.102]*** [0.646] [0.125]*** [0.229]*** [0.368]*** [0.267]*** [0.639] [1.757]
Observations 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 5050 4692 5050 5050 5050 5050 4692
0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TableA9: Revenue Efficiency - Impact of Doing Business Indicators (OLS Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: The Doing Business Indicators measure elements of the business climate on a country level a score indicates that the business climate is worse; all Indicators are measured defined, except for 
"Employing Workers [Rigidity of Employment]" and "Employing Workers [Firing]", which are measured on a scale from 0 to 100 (100 is the most rigid); the Doing Business Indicators report "Closing a 
Business [Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar]; this was recoded to "Closing a Business [100 - Recovery Rate in Cents to the Dollar]" such that, consistent with the other indicators, a higher score is 
associated with a worse business climate. 
12345678
Log Employment 0.389 0.457 0.402 0.489 0.755 0.731 0.735 0.710
[0.169]** [0.171]*** [0.174]** [0.173]*** [0.189]*** [0.193]*** [0.193]*** [0.204]***
Log Assets 0.709 0.610 0.702 0.578 0.289 0.316 0.321 0.349
[0.187]*** [0.200]*** [0.192]*** [0.202]*** [0.225] [0.244] [0.229] [0.255]
Log (1 + Exports / Sales) 0.825 1.021 -0.005 -0.023
[0.593] [0.670] [0.683] [0.775]
More than 3 Competitors -0.004 0.007 -0.069 -0.067
[0.081] [0.074] [0.073] [0.075]
Ownership [Privatized] 0.235 0.208 0.401 0.388
[0.427] [0.445] [0.422] [0.455]
Ownership [New Private] 0.089 0.053 0.215 0.180
[0.317] [0.349] [0.314] [0.352]
Ownership [Foreign] 1.904 1.942 1.835 1.878
[0.473]*** [0.452]*** [0.447]*** [0.414]***
Constant 0.904 0.962 0.889 0.950 0.928 0.942 0.858 0.868
[0.223]*** [0.221]*** [0.257]*** [0.244]*** [0.489]* [0.555]* [0.499]* [0.571]
Observations 1372 1355 1322 1305 1372 1355 1322 1305
J-Test 16.75 15.34 16.94 14.76 6.55 5.01 6.70 4.98
p-value 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.162 0.025 0.035 0.026
First stage F-tests
Log Employment 108.66 108.00 111.48 110.75 108.66 108.00 111.48 110.75
Log Assets 36.82 36.34 35.50 35.01 36.82 36.34 35.50 35.01
Log (1 + Exports / Sales) 15.20 14.17 15.20 14.17
Ownership [Privatized] 8.68 8.91 9.36 9.72
Ownership [New Private] 27.76 28.73 27.32 28.34
Ownership [Foreign] 5.24 4.95 5.60 5.29
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 22.17 21.04 20.50 20.55 33.65 33.19 29.88 29.68
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors, clustered by year, country, industry and firm size (small, medium and large) in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table A10: Revenue Efficiency - Baseline regressions on Panel Data                                              
(IV Estimation with Year, Country and Sector Fixed Effects)
Note: All models were estimated using IVs for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/Sales) and three Ownership 
Dummies. The IVs are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in 
fixed assets in previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill 
ratio and the skill ratio - age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies   
 
 